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ABSTRACT  
   
For over a century, researchers have been investigating collective 
cognition, in which a group of individuals together process information and act as 
a single cognitive unit. However, I still know little about circumstances under 
which groups achieve better (or worse) decisions than individuals. My 
dissertation research directly addressed this longstanding question, using the 
house-hunting ant Temnothorax rugatulus as a model system. Here I applied 
concepts and methods developed in psychology not only to individuals but also 
to colonies in order to investigate differences of their cognitive abilities. This 
approach is inspired by the superorganism concept, which sees a tightly 
integrated insect society as the analog of a single organism. I combined 
experimental manipulations and models to elucidate the emergent processes of 
collective cognition. My studies show that groups can achieve superior cognition 
by sharing the burden of option assessment among members and by integrating 
information from members using positive feedback. However, the same positive 
feedback can lock the group into a suboptimal choice in certain circumstances. 
Although ants are obligately social, my results show that they can be isolated and 
individually tested on cognitive tasks. In the future, this novel approach will help 
the field of animal behavior move towards better understanding of collective 
cognition. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Psychology is “the study of the mind ”— the perceptual experience that an 
organism internally has while interacting with the external world (Gazzaniga, 
Heatherton, and Halpern 2012). One of its main goals is to understand the 
mechanisms by which organisms acquire, process, and store information from 
the environment. These mechanisms are collectively known as cognition, which 
includes perception, learning, and memory (Shettleworth 2009). Psychologists 
have demonstrated the cognitive abilities of not only humans but also other 
species, from insects to primates (Dukas 1998; Papini 2008; Pearce 2008; 
Shettleworth 2009). For example, although the brain of honeybees has only 
0.01% as many neurons as that of humans, they demonstrate the ability to 
complete complex cognitive tasks (Chittka and Thomson 2001; Menzel and 
Giurfa 2001a). 
There are broadly two levels of explanations for cognition. First, the “ultimate 
explanation” is why existing cognition evolved. It deals with the question “what is 
the fitness benefit of certain cognition?” Cognitive abilities evolved by means of 
natural selection and thus should be adaptive in their environment. For example, 
homing pigeons are well-known for having internal maps with detailed landmarks 
(Wallraff 2005; Gazzaniga, Heatherton, and Halpern 2012). An ultimate 
explanation would be that the navigation abilities enable pigeons to acquire 
information about their position relative to food and mates and thus increase their 
fitness. Alternatively, “proximate explanation” is a mechanism underlying a 
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behavior. Proximate causes are usually specified at levels right down to events, 
such as hormones and neurons (Dukas 1998; Papini 2008; Pearce 2008; 
Shettleworth 2009). To continue with pigeons as an example, it has been 
suggested that neural activity in the hippocampal formation is responsible for this 
navigation ability (Gagliardo, Ioalé, and Bingman 1999).  
In this dissertation, I investigated collective cognition, in which a group of 
individuals that together process information and act as a single cognitive unit 
(Hofstadter 1999; Couzin 2009; Marshall and Franks 2009). I looked at this 
phenomenon at both the ultimate and proximate levels of explanation. At the 
ultimate level, I seek to understand whether collective information-processing 
increases fitness. Because the group success sometimes affects individual 
fitness, members may cooperate and coordinate with each other to induce 
advantageous collective decision-making (Smith 1964; Wilson 1973; Wilson 
1975). For example, a colony of cockroaches more likely chooses the better 
shelter between two than lone individuals (Canonge, Deneubourg, and Sempo 
2011), and a flock of pigeons uses more efficient homing routes than an 
individual (Biro et al. 2006). At the proximate level, studies of collective cognition 
have shown that it relies on decentralized mechanisms in which members have 
non-linear responses to information from others and positive feedback brings the 
group to consensus decisions (Conradt and Roper 2005; Detrain and 
Deneubourg 2006; Dussutour, Fourcassié, and Jeanson 2012) 
As of yet, I have not challenged cognitive groups beyond rudimentary tasks such 
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as choosing one of two options, and so I still do not know full cognitive 
capabilities of animal groups. To investigate these, I applied concepts and 
methods developed in psychology to animal groups. Psychologists have focused 
on individual human cognition and described it in detail. Because a cohesive 
animal group acts as a single cognitive unit, I can apply the very same 
psychology approaches to animal groups to investigate different aspects of 
collective cognition. In this way, I can analyze cognition at both the ultimate level 
(e.g. are certain collective cognitive abilities superior to those of individuals?) and 
the proximate level (e.g. how do individuals collectively achieve these abilities?).     
I have used this strategy to investigate collective cognition in social insects. 
Because of the high genetic relatedness among colony members, individuals 
gain fitness benefits from the their colony’s success, rather than their own 
(Hölldobler and Wilson, 2008). This has allowed selection to shape extremely 
unified collective behavior, and thus colonies of social insects can be considered 
as a superorganism, analogous to a single organism (Hölldobler and Wilson, 
2008; Seeley, 1989; Wheeler, 1911). A superorganism offers some of the most 
compelling and well-studied examples of collective cognition (Franks 1989; 
Seeley 1997; Hirsh and Gordon 2001; Seeley and Buhrman 2001; Pratt 2005a; 
Passino and Seeley 2006a; Visscher 2007; Marshall et al. 2009). For example, 
Argentine ants, Iridomyrmex humilis, are collectively able to find the shortest path 
to a food source by simply exploiting pheromones while carrying food home 
(Deneubourg et al. 1990). 
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The research presented here focuses on collective cognition in the ant 
Temnothorax rugatulus (formerly Leptothorax rugatulus) (Formicidae: 
Mymicinae) (Figure 1.1). Colonies typically live in fragile rock crevices, and are 
adept at collectively choosing a new home if their old nest becomes inadequate 
(Möglich 1978; Mallon, Pratt, and Franks 2001; Visscher 2007). House-hunting in 
this genus has grown into a leading model system for group cognition, driven by 
its many practical advantages. First, their colony size is relatively small, ranging 
from 50 to 250 ants, so it is relatively easy to identify each ant by marking them 
with unique colors. Second, not only are colonies adept at consistently choosing 
a favored nest among a group of inferior ones (Visscher, 2007), but individuals 
are adept as well (Chapter 2). Thus, I was able to assess and compare the 
cognitive abilities of colonies and individuals. Third, because they achieve such 
good decisions mainly by a series of observable recruitment behaviors (see 
below for details), I was able to record how information is transmitted among 
individuals and link these mechanisms to collective cognitive abilities.  
These features have let the house-hunting behavior of Temnothorax colonies be 
well documented (Dornhaus and Franks, 2006; Franks et al., 2003a; Franks et 
al., 2006; Franks et al., 2003b; Mallon et al., 2001a; Planque et al., 2007a; Pratt, 
2005a, 2008; Pratt and Sumpter, 2006; Pratt et al., 2005). Laboratory 
observation, where individual ants can be easily tracked, has revealed how a 
colony can select the better of two nest sites, even when few if any individual 
ants have the opportunity to assess more than one option. Instead, comparison 
emerges from a competition between recruitment efforts at different sites. The 
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key elements of this competition are two behavioral rules followed by the scout 
ants responsible for carrying out the emigration (Figure 1.2a,b). First, if a scout 
finds a potential new nest, her probability of recruiting nestmates to it depends on 
the site’s quality, as determined by its entrance size, floor area, cavity thickness, 
light level, and many other features (Mallon et al. 2001). The ants she summons 
follow the same rule, creating positive feedback that drives up site population at a 
quality-dependent rate. Second, the scouts accelerate their recruitment once the 
site population surpasses a threshold. Because better sites are likely to reach the 
threshold earlier, this quorum rule amplifies the difference in population growth, 
and the colony is quickly directed towards the best nest (Figure 1.2c,d) (Pratt et 
al. 2005, Pratt and Sumpter 2006).  
In this study, I investigated proximate and ultimate explanations of collective 
cognition by applying psychology methods and concepts to Temnothorax ants. 
To compare cognition of colonies with that of individuals, I first investigated 
whether and how well isolated individuals can make decisions (Chapter 2). Then, 
I explored rationality of decision-making (Appendix B), cognitive capacity 
(Appendix C) and sensory discrimination (Chapter 3) of individuals and colonies. 
Finally, I investigated how past experience affects collective decision-making 
(Chapter 4).  
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Figure.1.1. Temnothorax rugatulus colony showing small colony size and 
individual marking. 
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Figure 1.2. (a) Tandem running: a leader attracts a single nest-mate to follow her 
to the new nest. (b) Transport: recruiter physically carries nest-mates, one at a 
time. Transport is much faster and more stable than the tandem running.  
Recruitment behavior switches from tandem-running to transport when the 
population reaches a certain number, or quorum (c and d). This quorum rule 
amplifies the difference in population growth, and the colony is quickly directed 
towards the best nest.  The recruitment acts in (d) are all towards the good nest. 
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Chapter 2 
INDIVIDUAL ANTS MAKE DIRECT COMPARISON 
Abstract 
An optimal decision-making strategy for choosing one among multiple options is 
to compare them and pick the best. However, this process can be time 
consuming, especially when the number of options is large. Unlike solitary 
animals, social insect colonies can manage this trade-off using parallel 
assessment by multiple individuals. This transfer of comparisons from individual 
to group raises the question of whether individual social insects have lost the 
ability to compare options. Past studies have addressed this question in house-
hunting Temnothorax ants, but their findings were contradictory and inconclusive. 
In this study, I developed a Markov chain model to predict how often ants should 
choose a better nest over a poor one under the assumption that they make no 
comparisons. I estimated the model’s parameters from empirical data and 
compared its predictions to the outcome of actual binary choices made by 
isolated ants. The results showed that ants chose the better nest more often than 
predicted, thus indicating that they make comparisons among options. The 
current trend of “swarm intelligence” assumes that cognition of social insects is 
fundamentally limited. However, our results suggest that I should never dismiss 
the remarkable cognition of individual colony members. 
Introduction 
Animals often have to choose one among multiple options, such as mates, food 
sources and habitats. A decision-making strategy for maximizing the fitness 
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outcome of a choice is to compare all available options and pick the best one 
among them. However, this process can be time consuming, especially when the 
number of options is large (Real, 1990). Animals may therefore rely instead on 
faster heuristics that do not always yield the best option (Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein 1996; Hutchinson and Gigerenzer 2005). This speed-accuracy trade-
off is a common feature of decision-making faced by a wide range of animals 
(Franks, Dornhaus, et al. 2003a; Marshall et al. 2006; Passino and Seeley 
2006a; Ings and Chittka 2008; Chittka, Skorupski, and Raine 2009). For 
example, when bumblebees faced a color discrimination task on a virtual flower 
meadow, some bees consistently made rapid but inaccurate decisions while 
others were slow but accurate (Chittka et al. 2003).  
Unlike solitary animals, social insect colonies can manage this trade-off using 
parallel assessment by multiple individuals. That is, each colony member 
assesses only one or a few options, and the colony collectively compares all of 
these assessments to improve its decision quality. For example, when a colony 
of the ant Lasius niger is offered several food sources, each forager typically 
visits only a single feeder, recruiting nestmates to it with a strength that depends 
on feeder quality. Through positive feedback, this leads to stronger trails to better 
sources, with the best source eventually attracting all foragers (Beckers, 
Deneubourg, and Goss 1992; Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Hutchinson and 
Gigerenzer 2005). In effect, the act of comparing feeders is distributed across the 
colony as a whole, without any single ant needing to make a comparison. Similar 
examples are known from a variety of social insects (Seeley 1986; Beckers et al. 
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1990; Seeley and Buhrman 1999; Visscher and Camazine 1999; Mallon, Pratt, 
and Franks 2001; Franks, Dornhaus, et al. 2003a; Marshall et al. 2006; Passino 
and Seeley 2006a; Ings and Chittka 2008; Chittka, Skorupski, and Raine 2009). 
This transfer of comparisons from individual to group raises the question of 
whether individual social insects have lost the ability to compare options. 
Because a colony of social insects divides labor and each member repeatedly 
performs the same task, only highly specialized abilities might have been 
selected for (McShea 2000; Anderson and McShea 2001). Thus, social insects 
might have lost the ability to make comparisons because it is not necessary for 
collective decision-making. On the other hand, because social insects are 
morphologically similar to solitary ones, who presumably can make comparisons, 
it is plausible that individual social insects are also capable of doing so. Individual 
social insects clearly possess sophisticated cognitive abilities (Gould 1990; 
Menzel and Giurfa 2001b; Chittka et al. 2003; Collett et al. 2006; Avarguès-
Weber, Deisig, and Giurfa 2011). For example, desert ants track their position 
relative to their home using path integration (Wittlinger, Wehner, and Wolf 2006; 
Wittlinger, Wehner, and Wolf 2007) and honeybees use waggle dances to 
convey complex spatial information to their nestmates (Frisch 1993). These 
findings suggest that cognition of individual social insects is sophisticated enough 
for them to make comparisons.  
These contradictory hypotheses had not been directly tested until ten years ago. 
Close observations of individual decision-making showed that house-hunting 
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Temnothorax ants are able to make comparisons (Mallon, Pratt, and Franks 
2001). Similar to the mechanism of collective decision-making by Lasius ants 
mentioned above, the whole colony can migrate to the best nest among several 
without individual comparisons (Pratt and Sumpter 2006; Visscher 2007). Mallon 
et al. (2001) focused on the minority of ants that visited more than one candidate 
nest and found that these ants were more likely to choose the better nest than 
predicted if they don’t make comparisons. Therefore, they concluded that 
individual Temnothorax ants can make comparisons.  
Recently, Robinson et al. (2009) argued that these results do not necessarily 
provide evidence for individual direct comparison. They stressed the adequacy of 
the emergent mechanism based solely on individual evaluation of a single nest. 
They assumed that an ant that visits a nest either accepts it and starts recruiting 
nestmates or rejects it and continues searching. Even if she later returns to a 
rejected nest, she will treat it as a new discovery. Based on a computer 
simulation implementing these rules, they concluded that individual comparisons 
were not required to replicate the results in Mallon et al. (2001).  
The status of individual comparison remains unclear, because both of these 
studies are inconclusive. First, Mallon et al. (2001) looked at colony migrations, 
where each ant’s behavior is influenced by her nestmates. For example, ants 
dramatically increase their recruitment speed when the population in a candidate 
new nest reaches a minimum number, or quorum (Pratt et al. 2002; Pratt 2005a). 
The presence of nestmates might similarly affect an individual’s assessment of a 
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site and thus her probability of recruiting to it. Second, Robinson et al. (2011) did 
not estimate their model’s parameters from empirical data. In particular, they 
used unrealistically high differences in the likelihood of recruitment to good and 
poor nests in order to replicate the results of Mallon et al. (2001). Therefore, the 
results of their simulations may not accurately predict real colony behavior. 
In this study, I address both of these issues by making and testing a new model 
of the behavior of isolated ants. In order to predict how ants should behave if 
they do not make direct comparisons, the model is “memory-less”, meaning that 
future behavior depends solely on current state. To empirically measure 
parameters for this model, I first isolated ants from their colonies to avoid 
confounding social effects from other nestmates. Then, I placed each ant 
individually in an arena with a few brood items and a single nest, either good or 
poor. By observing how long it took ants to move the brood into the nest, I 
estimated their probabilities of accepting each site type. The model based on 
these empirical data provided an estimate of the probability of ants choosing the 
better nest in a binary choice if they did not make comparisons. These 
predictions were then compared to the outcome of actual binary choices using 
isolated ants. To determine whether ants make comparisons, I tested if the ants 
showed a higher than predicted probability of choosing the better nest.   
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Materials and Methods 
Markov model of choice behavior 
To predict what would happen if isolated ants do not make direct comparisons, I 
modeled their behavior as an absorbing Markov chain (Howard 1971; Kemeny 
and Snell 1976). This approach describes the ant’s behavior as a sequence of 
transitions among a limited number of discrete states. Its main assumption is that 
each transition depends only on the current state. 
When ants choose between two nests, they typically visit both nests multiple 
times and eventually pick one of them. Thus, our Markov model consists of four 
states linked by three transition rates (Figure 2.1). These four states are “in good 
nest”, “in poor nest”, “accept good nest” and “accept poor nest”. In the first two 
states, ants are in the good/poor nest and assess it. In the last two states, ants 
decide to accept the good/poor nest and transport brood to it. These accepting 
states are called absorbing states because individuals are “absorbed” to these 
states and do not move any further (thus, no arrows are going out from them in 
Figure 2.1). The three transition rates among these states are acceptance rates, 
return rates and transition rates. The acceptance rates (AG and AP) are the 
probabilities that an ant in a nest decides to choose that nest as her new home. 
The return rates (RG and RP) are the probabilities that ants leave a nest and 
come back to the same nest. Finally, the transition (TGP and TPG) rates are the 
probabilities that they leave a nest and go to the other nest. 
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I performed experiments to estimate these rates. To obtain the acceptance rates, 
I introduced one of the target nests, a good or poor one (single choice treatment), 
and counted the number of visits before the new nest was finally accepted. Each 
target nest’s acceptance rate is the inverse of the average number of visits 
across individuals. To obtain the return rates and the transition rates, I introduced 
both the good and poor nests (binary choice treatment). I counted the number of 
visits for each ant. The return rates and transition rates are inverses of these 
numbers. 
Because the ants often visit both nests multiple times and eventually accept one 
of them, this Markov chain allows us to calculate how likely ants would choose a 
good nest over a poor one if they do not make direct comparisons (Table 2.1). 
Then I compared this probability based on the Markov chain with the one that I 
obtained in the binary treatment for ants. I tested this with a χ2 test of 
independence by comparing the expected and empirical data of the proportion of 
choosing the better nest. If ants make a comparison, the probability of choosing 
the better nest should be higher in the empirical data than in the estimated one. 
Nest designs 
Each subject was required to start from a home nest and then choose one of two 
target nests. The three kinds of nests were identical except for their entrance 
size. The home nest had a mediocre entrance size (
  
φ=3.2 mm).  The better 
target nest had a smaller entrance size (
  
φ=2.0 mm), and thus was preferable to 
the poorer target nest (
  
φ=5.5 mm) since Temnothorax ants strongly prefer 
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smaller entrances (Pratt and Pierce 2001; Franks, Mallon, et al. 2003b; Pratt 
2005a). The roof and floor of the nest were made of glass microscope slides (50 
x 75 mm). An entrance was made by drilling a hole in the center of the roof. The 
cavity was constructed from a balsa wood slat (2.4 mm thickness) with a circular 
hole (38.1 mm diameter) drilled through its center. 
Test subjects 
The subjects were 50 individual ants taken from 23 colonies of Temnothorax 
rugatulus. In other Temnothorax species, only a minority of a colony’s workers 
participate actively in nest site selection (Mallon, Pratt, and Franks 2001; Pratt et 
al. 2002; Pratt 2005a). These ants search for and assess sites, recruit fellow 
scouts, and transport brood items and non-scouts to the chosen site. I assumed 
that a similar pattern holds in T. rugatulus and took steps to ensure that I tested 
only these active scouts. Since emigration requires scouts to carry brood to the 
new home, I put brood items outside of the nest and selected as subjects those 
ants that retrieved them.  
All colonies were collected in the Pinal Mountains near Globe, AZ, and were 
queenright, with worker populations raging from 100 to 250 and brood 
populations ranging from 100 to 200. Colonies were housed in a plastic box (11 x 
11 cm) with Fluon-coated walls to prevent the ants from escaping. Each box 
contained a water-filled plastic tube capped with cotton and an agar-based diet 
(Bhatkar and Whitcomb 1970). 
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Procedure 
Single choice experiment 
To estimate the acceptance rates (AG and AP) in the Markov Chain formula, I 
introduced a single target nest, either a good or poor nest, to individual ants and 
then calculated the probability that each ant accepts the target nest as their new 
nest. 
A home nest was introduced to the shorter wall of the experiment arena (17.8 x 
12.7 cm).  Along with this nest, two brood items were placed outside of the home 
nest’s entrance. I introduced one individual ant into the arena. I waited for 12 
hours, and most individual ants (82%) put the brood items inside the nest during 
this time period. Thus, I can safely conclude that that she experienced the home 
nest. Then a target nest was placed near the center of the opposite wall. The roof 
of the home nest was removed to induce her to move the brood items to the 
target nest. I videotaped this process for 24 hours, and 91% of ants completed 
the task within this time period. From this record, to estimate an acceptance rate 
for each nest, I first counted the number of visits ants made to a target nest 
before they carried brood items to it. I then took the inverse of this number for 
each ant. I estimated the acceptance rate as the average of these inverses over 
all ants. 
Each ant was tested only once. Blue plastic sheets were placed underneath all 
the nests to make brood more visible in the video recordings. The walls of the 
arena were coated with Fluon. Arenas were illuminated by two LED light panels 
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mounted on walls 36 cm above the nest, and the ambient level just outside the 
nest was approximately 115 lux. 
Binary choice experiment 
To estimate the probability that ants actually choose the good nest over the poor 
one, I introduced both good and bad nests to them. From the same data, I also 
estimated the return rates (RG and RP) and transition rates (TGP and TPG) for our 
Markov model by calculating the probability that each ant moved from one nest to 
the same nest and the probability that they moved from one nest to the other 
nest.  
The methods of this experiment were identical to the single nest experiment 
except that I introduced both target nests to the arena. 81% of test subjects put 
the brood items inside the home nest within 12 hours. Then, the roof of the home 
nest was removed to induce the ant to move the brood items to one of the target 
nests. I videotaped this process for 24 hours, and 83% of ants completed the 
task within this time period. From this record, to estimate the return rates, I first 
counted the numbers of visits to the same target nest until the ant chose a nest. I 
then took the inverse of this number for each ant. I estimated the return rate as 
the average of these inverses over all ants. A similar procedure was used to 
estimate transition rates by counting numbers of visits to the other nest. 
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Results 
The Markov model, using parameter values estimated from data (Table 2.2) 
predicts that 63% of ants should choose the good nest if they do not make direct 
comparisons between sites (Table 2.3). This corresponds to 15.1 of the 24 
subjects. In fact, 21 subjects (86%) chose the good nest over the poor one 
(Table 2.3). This proportion is significantly higher than predicted by the Markov 
model (χ2 = 6.31, df = 1, N = 24, p = 0.012), leading us to reject the null 
hypothesis that ants do not make direct comparisons. 
The estimated acceptance rate for the good nest (AG) is roughly 1.5 times higher 
than that for the poor nest (AP), consistent with past research showing that ants 
more likely visit and accept a good nest than a poor one (Pratt 2005a; Robinson 
et al. 2009). The return rates (RG and RP) are similar to each other, as are the 
transition rates (TGP and TPG), although visits to the good nest are slightly more 
frequent than to the poor one (i.e. RG > RP and TGP > TPG).  
Discussion  
Algorithms for collective decision-making in social insects typically assume the 
absence of individual comparisons (Bonabeau, Dorigo, and Theraulaz 1999; 
Bonabeau, Dorigo, and Theraulaz 2000; Dorigo, Bonabeau, and Theraulaz 
2000), but it is rare for this assumption to be empirically tested. An exception is 
house-hunting by Temnothorax ants, where two past studies have directly 
investigated the existence of individual comparison. Nevertheless, these results 
are inconsistent: one study showed they do make comparisons (Mallon, Pratt, 
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and Franks 2001) while another showed that they do not (Robinson et al. 2009). 
Because these studies examined individual comparisons during colony 
migrations, interactions with other colony members might affect their 
assessments. In our experiment, to avoid potential influence by other nestmates, 
I isolated them from each other and individually tested them. Our results strongly 
indicate that the individual ants in fact make direct comparisons. I used a 
mathematical tool, the absorbing Markov chain, to estimate how likely ants would 
choose the better nest if they do not make direct comparisons. The displayed 
tendency for the ants to choose the better nest significantly exceeded this 
estimate. In other words, ants do not independently assess nests, but instead 
they remember the quality of at least one nest site and compare it to future nests.  
Our finding that Temnothorax individual ants can make comparisons is consistent 
with the suggestions of several recent studies. For instance, nest site decisions 
by isolated T. rugatulus violate a principle of rational choice called Independence 
from Irrelevant Alternatives (Appendix B). In that experiment, the preference 
between two nest sites was altered by a third site, which was less preferred than 
the first two sites. These decoy effects imply direct comparisons among options 
(Beckers, Deneubourg, and Goss 1992; Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; 
Bateson and Healy 2005; Hutchinson and Gigerenzer 2005), suggesting that this 
is the mechanism these ants use to make decisions. Furthermore, individual ants 
experience cognitive overload (Appendix C), in which the quality of a decision is 
impaired by a large number of options (M Schroder, J Driver, and Streufert 1967; 
McShea 2000; Anderson and McShea 2001; Schwartz 2004). Since this 
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phenomenon is a consequence of decision makers processing too much 
information, it is likely that these individuals are attempting to compare the many 
nest sites they are faced with. Finally, central to assuming that ants cannot make 
direct comparisons is the implication that they do not have memory for potential 
nest sites. However, a recent study demonstrated that ants can remember the 
quality and location of potential nest sites encountered before migrations, an 
ability that contributes to faster and more accurate decisions (Gould 1990; 
Menzel and Giurfa 2001b; Chittka et al. 2003; Collett et al. 2006; Stroeymeyt, 
Giurfa, and Franks 2010; Avarguès-Weber, Deisig, and Giurfa 2011). 
Why did Robinson et al. (2009) not observe individual comparisons? In their 
experiment, they observed only 13 ants that visited both the good and poor 
nests. Because these informed ants did not choose the better site more often 
then expected by chance, they concluded that ants do not make direct 
comparisons. However, this claim is weakened by their small sample size, which 
could yield insufficient power to detect a real effect. 
Although our results show that individuals can make comparisons, I still do not 
know how important this ability is to a colony’s decision-making. Because a 
majority of ants do not have an opportunity to do so during migrations (Mallon, 
Pratt, and Franks 2001), this ability may have little impact on collective decisions. 
On the other hand, although only a small portion of ants makes comparisons, 
their presence might substantially improve colony decision-making. For example, 
laboratory experiments show that colony members sometimes split among 
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several nest sites, but that they often eventually merge at the best site. If they 
were not able to compare their own new home sites with others, it would be hard 
to resolve these colony splits. Finally, a computer model of Temnothorax nest 
choice predicts that direct comparisons by colony members dramatically 
improves the quality of their colony decision-making (Marshall et al. 2006). 
Future research will be needed to explore the impact of the ability of individual 
comparison on collective decisions.  
Recently, many researchers in biology as well as mathematics, computer 
sciences and others, have been interested in group decision-making in social 
insects because sophisticated colony cognition emerges from simple individuals. 
As a result, it is sometimes assumed that ants’ cognition is fundamentally very 
limited. However, our results support the notion that individual insects also have 
sophisticated cognition (Seeley 2002). The current trend of “swarm intelligence” 
should never dismiss the remarkable cognition of individual colony members. 
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Figure 2.1. Markov chain process for choice behavior. Each box is a discrete 
state and each parameter is a transition probability. Arrows indicate possible 
transitions. Because transition probabilities depend only on the current state, this 
process is “memoryless”.  
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Table 2.1. Markov model matrix for choice behavior. Each number is a probability 
of transiting from the current state (row) to the next state (column) 
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Table 2.2. Parameters for the Markov model. The parameters AG and AP were 
obtained from the single choice experiment while the others (RG, RP, TGP, and 
TPG) were from the binary choice experiment. Please see the text for details of 
the estimation procedure. 
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Table 2.3. Expected and actual frequencies of choices for good and bad nests 
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Chapter 3 
A CROWD IS WISE FOR HARD TASKS BUT NOT FOR EASY ONES 
Abstract 
“Collective intelligence” and “wisdom of crowds” refer to situations where groups 
achieve more accurate perception and better decisions than solitary agents 
(Franks et al. 2002; Conradt and Roper 2005; Surowiecki 2005; Biro et al. 2006; 
Ward et al. 2008; Couzin 2009; Krause, Ruxton, and Krause 2010; Woolley et al. 
2010; Sasaki and Pratt 2012). Whether groups outperform individuals should 
depend on the kind of task and its difficulty (Sherman and Visscher 2002; 
Dornhaus and Chittka 2004; Sasaki and Pratt 2011; Sasaki and Pratt 2012), but 
the nature of this relationship remains unknown (Conradt and Roper 2005; 
Couzin 2009; Sasaki and Pratt 2012). Here I show that colonies of Temnothorax 
ants outperform individuals for a difficult perception task, but that individuals do 
better than groups when the task is easy. Subjects were required to choose the 
better of two nest sites as the quality difference was varied. For small 
differences, colonies were more likely than isolated ants to choose the better site, 
but this relationship was reversed for large differences. I explain these results 
using a mathematical model, which shows that positive feedback between group 
members effectively integrates information and sharpens the discrimination of 
fine differences. When the task is easier the same positive feedback can lock the 
colony into a suboptimal choice. These results suggest the conditions under 
which crowds do or do not become wise. 
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Introduction 
In many taxa, from bacteria to humans, individuals cooperate to evaluate their 
environment and make collective decisions (Nakagaki, Yamada, and Tóth 2000; 
Ward et al. 2008; Couzin 2009; Woolley et al. 2010; Sasaki and Pratt 2011). By 
combining multiple assessments, these groups attain more precise estimates 
and make more accurate decisions than solitary animals (Fechner, Adler, and 
Howes 1966; Gescheider 1997; Surowiecki 2005; Krause, Ruxton, and Krause 
2010; Seeley 2010). For example, when many diverse individuals independently 
guess a quantity (e.g. the number of marbles in a jar or the weight of an ox), the 
group’s average estimate is often close to the actual value (Galton 1907; Chittka 
et al. 2001; Dyer and Chittka 2004; King and Cowlishaw 2007; Dyer, Spaethe, 
and Prack 2008; Lorenz et al. 2011). Similarly, groups of fish can better 
distinguish between stimuli than individuals (Ward et al. 2008), and pairs of 
homing pigeons take more efficient routes than solitary birds (Biro et al. 2006). 
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and the Central Limit Theorem show that the 
accuracy of a group of independent decision-makers improves with group size 
(Condorcet 1785; Hamilton 1967; Wallraff 1978; Simons 2004; Sumpter 2010). 
Although wisdom of crowds has both empirical and theoretical support, many 
examples of collective failure have been documented (Kerr and Tindale 2004; 
Krause, Ruxton, and Krause 2010; Bahrami et al. 2012). People in groups 
sometimes arrive at absurd decisions they would not likely make on their own 
(Janis 1972; Franks et al. 2002; Conradt and Roper 2005; Surowiecki 2005; 
Ward et al. 2008; Couzin 2009; Sasaki and Pratt 2012). Collectives fail even in 
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estimation tasks, where they should be especially good at filtering out random 
errors made by individual members (Sherman and Visscher 2002; Dornhaus and 
Chittka 2004; Lorenz et al. 2011; Sasaki and Pratt 2011; Sasaki and Pratt 2012). 
The problem is that groups often violate the assumption of independent decision-
making that is central to the wisdom of crowds (Janis 1972; Conradt and Roper 
2005; Ward et al. 2008; Couzin 2009; Sasaki and Pratt 2012). Theories assume 
that individual assessments are made in isolation, and then integrated by a 
centralized process such as vote counting or averaging. Real groups instead rely 
on decentralized mechanisms in which interactions and positive feedback bring 
the group to consensus (Nakagaki, Yamada, and Tóth 2000; Conradt and Roper 
2005; Detrain and Deneubourg 2006; Ward et al. 2008; Couzin 2009; Woolley et 
al. 2010; Sasaki and Pratt 2011; Dussutour, Fourcassié, and Jeanson 2012). 
These interactions may either improve intelligence by integrating multiple 
assessments, or hurt it by amplifying mistakes. Understanding which outcome 
will happen requires a comparison between individual and group performance 
across a range of challenges. 
House-hunting by Temnothorax ants provides an excellent model system for this 
approach (Fechner, Adler, and Howes 1966; Gescheider 1997; Mallon, Pratt, and 
Franks 2001; Franks, Dornhaus, et al. 2003a; Franks, Mallon, et al. 2003b; Pratt, 
Sumpter, and Mallon 2005; Surowiecki 2005; Pratt 2005a; Dornhaus and Franks 
2006; Pratt 2008; Krause, Ruxton, and Krause 2010; Seeley 2010). Colonies are 
able to select the better of two nest sites, even when few if any individual ants 
have the opportunity to assess more than one option (Galton 1907; Chittka et al. 
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2001; Mallon, Pratt, and Franks 2001; Dyer and Chittka 2004; King and 
Cowlishaw 2007; Dyer, Spaethe, and Prack 2008; Lorenz et al. 2011). A 
collective decision instead emerges from a competition between recruitment 
efforts at different sites (Franks et al. 2002; Ward et al. 2008). At the same time, 
if ants are experimentally isolated, they can still distinguish two sites of different 
quality, allowing the decision-making of individuals to be compared with that of 
colonies (Biro et al. 2006; Sasaki and Pratt 2011; Sasaki and Pratt 2012). This 
approach has shown that colonies can effectively compare a larger option set 
than individuals (Condorcet 1785; Hamilton 1967; Wallraff 1978; Simons 2004; 
Sumpter 2010; Sasaki and Pratt 2012), and that they are less vulnerable to 
irrational preference shifts induced by decoys (Kerr and Tindale 2004; Krause, 
Ruxton, and Krause 2010; Sasaki and Pratt 2011; Bahrami et al. 2012). No 
study, however, has determined how group advantage varies as the difficulty of 
the task changes.  
To address this issue, I adapted psychophysical methods typically used to study 
sensory discrimination in individual humans or animals (Fechner, Adler, and 
Howes 1966; Gescheider 1997) (Chittka et al. 2001; Dyer and Chittka 2004; 
Dyer, Spaethe, and Prack 2008). Temnothorax rugatulus subjects (either an 
individual, a small colony, or a large colony) were given a choice between a 
constant nest, with a very dim interior light level, and a brighter comparison nest 
(Figure 3.1). All subjects were expected to prefer the constant nest, because 
these ants have a strong and unambiguous bias toward darker sites (Franks, 
Mallon, et al. 2003b; Pratt 2005a). Thus, any choice of the comparison nest could 
 30 
be taken as a failure to discriminate the options. The brightness of the 
comparison nest was varied across tests in order to provide an array of 
challenges of varying difficulty. Discrimination ability was measured in terms of 
the functional relationship between the brightness of the comparison nest and the 
probability of choosing the constant nest.  
Results 
As expected, both individuals and colonies made more accurate decisions as the 
choice became easier (Figure 3.2a). However, the shapes of the discrimination 
curves were quite different. I fitted separate sigmoidal response functions to the 
colony and individual data: 
 
€ 
P(correct choice) = 0.5 + 0.5 λ
1+ e
−(x−α )
β
   (1) 
where α is the discrimination threshold (i.e., the smallest detectable difference in 
illumination), β is a scale parameter, and λ is the asymptotic level of 
discrimination (Wichmann and Hill 2001). When the differences were small (i.e. 
difficult choices), colonies more precisely discriminated options than individuals 
did. Specifically, the median discrimination threshold α was 7.4 lux for colonies 
and 32.3 lux for individuals (Monte Carlo test for αindividual > αcolony, p = 0.0047). 
When the choice was easy colonies no longer outperformed individuals, as 
shown by the higher asymptotic performance of individuals (λ individual =0.93) 
compared to colonies (λ colony =0.80; Monte Carlo test for λ colony < λ individual, p = 
0.050). Large colonies marginally outperformed small ones across all differences 
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(Figure 3.2b), but this advantage was not statistically significant (Figure S2 in 
Appendix A) 
To explain these patterns I further investigated the mechanisms by which 
individual ants make a decision. I first considered the behavior of isolated ants, 
whose decision-making behavior is relatively poorly understood. By observing 
lone ants as they chose between two sites of different quality, I established that 
they make multiple visits to each site, eventually accepting one of them as a new 
home with a probability that depends on site quality. Furthermore, their 
probability of choosing correctly grows with the number of times they compare 
the sites (i.e., visit the two sites in succession; see supplementary materials). 
Based on these observations I modeled an ant’s probability after i comparisons 
of accepting the good nest A or the mediocre nest B: 
 
(2) 
where qA>qB are the intrinsic qualities of the nests. As well as reproducing the 
observed increase in acceptance probability with number of visits (Figure S1 in 
Appendix A), this model implies that the accept probability increases faster when 
the quality difference between the nests is large. This features reflects the 
relative ease of distinguishing sites that are very different in quality. 
€ 
pA (i) = qA
pB (i) = qB (
2qB
qB + qA
)i
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I assumed that a similar process applies to individual ants within intact colonies, 
but in combination with social information. Colonies rely on a well-described 
collective mechanism built on three key components: 1) When a scout accepts a 
site she initiates recruitment of fellow scouts who make their own independent 
assessment; 2) An ant’s probability of initiating recruitment is higher for better 
sites, leading to differential positive feedback on scout population at the two 
sites; 3) This difference is amplified by a quorum rule that increases commitment 
to a site when its population surpasses a threshold. (Franks et al. 2002). I 
accounted for these rules by expanding the model as follows: 
 
(3) 
where hA(i) and hB(i) give the individual probabilities of accepting a site after i 
comparisons, NA and NB are the number of ants in the two nests, and T 
determines the population at which a quorum is reached and the probability of 
commitment increases sharply (Sumpter and Pratt 2009). The parameter c 
determines the relative weighting of individual assessment and social information 
(c = 0 for solitary ants). A full description of the model along with all parameter 
values is provided in the supplementary material. When the model was used to 
simulate the nest discrimination experiment, the output matched our observation 
€ 
hA (i) = pA (i) + c
NA2
NA2 +T 2
hB (i) = pB (i) + c
NB2
NB2 +T 2
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that both individuals and colonies become more accurate as the choice becomes 
easier (Figure 3.3).  
More interestingly, the model showed the distinctive crossing of discrimination 
curves seen in the data, with colonies doing better at difficult choices and 
individuals doing better for easier ones (compare Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3). In 
order to further test this prediction, I gathered more data for choices involving 
comparison stimuli on either side of the crossing point observed in the first 
experiment (Figure S3 in Appendix A). Adding these data and refitting equation 1 
gave revised discrimination thresholds αcolony = 6.6 lux and αindividual = 30.9 lux, 
and saturation levels λcolony = 0.78 and λindividual =0.89.  These data provided even 
stronger support for the better performance of groups on difficult tasks (p = 
0.0020) and similar results for the better performance of individuals on easy 
tasks (p = 0.052). 
Discussion 
Our empirical results show the wisdom of crowds for difficult decisions, but the 
opposite effect when decisions are easy. The model suggests that the reason 
lies in the different mechanisms employed by individuals and colonies when 
assessing options. For a difficult choice, solitary individuals have a relatively high 
probability of accepting the worse nest, because they rely on quality-dependent 
acceptance probabilities that differ little for similar nests. Successive 
comparisons cause these probabilities to diverge, but the ant is likely to make her 
decision before this slow process has had much effect. In whole colonies, on the 
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other hand, positive feedback and the quorum rule quickly amplify the difference 
in acceptance rates, allowing the colony to settle on the better site more 
frequently. As the decision becomes easier, however, acceptance probabilities 
diverge more rapidly with comparison, allowing solitary ants to reach the right 
choice with high probability. Studies in honeybees have shown that social 
interactions do not always improve collective foraging, depending on the 
distribution of food (Sherman and Visscher 2002; Dornhaus and Chittka 2004). 
Our study confirms this point and further demonstrates that these interactions 
sometimes even lower collective performance. This happens when random 
fluctuations yield a quorum for the inferior nest, locking the colony onto the wrong 
choice. 
The colony’s decentralized mechanism sacrifices some level of accuracy in order 
to make a more rapid decision (Marshall et al. 2006; Passino and Seeley 2006b; 
Chittka, Skorupski, and Raine 2009; Marshall et al. 2009). Our model predicts 
such a tradeoff for easier choices, with greater individual accuracy coming at the 
cost of much slower decision-making. This is consistent with the observation that 
individuals take much longer to arrive at a decision than is typical for colonies 
(Supplemental material). However, there is not always a speed-accuracy tradeoff 
(Sumpter, Zabzina, and Nicolis 2012). When the choice is difficult, by sharing the 
burden of nest assessment, colonies make decisions both faster and more 
accurately (Figure S8 in Appendix A).  
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While the wisdom of crowds has been acknowledged for decades, its failure or 
“madness of crowds” (Mackay 1841), has been recognized for even longer (Kerr 
and Tindale 2004). Our work suggests that “madness” and “wisdom” are 
inescapably entwined. Enhanced group cognition is a clear benefit of living 
together (Condorcet 1785; Hamilton 1967; Wallraff 1978; Simons 2004; Sumpter 
2010), but in situations where decision-making should be straight forward there is 
a cost to relying on the judgment of others.  
Materials and Methods 
Nest designs  
To measure decision-making performance, I offered subjects binary choices 
between two kinds of nest: a constant nest and a comparison nest. The constant 
nest was the same in all choices, with an interior light level of 1 lux.  The 
comparison nest was always brighter than the constant nest, but its specific light 
level was varied across trials  (7, 14, 20, 28, 39, 56 or 112 lux). Each nest was 
made from a balsa wood slat (2.4 mm thick) sandwiched between glass 
microscope slides (50 x 75 mm). A circular cavity (38 mm diameter) was cut 
through the middle of the slat, and a 2mm entrance opening was cut out of the 
side of the nest (Figure S1 in Appendix A). The floor of the cavity consisted of a 
single glass slide, while the roof was made from two stacked slides. Interior 
illumination was adjusted by placing transparent neutral density filters (Rosco 
Cinegel) between the two roof slides. This design prevented ants from directly 
contacting the filters, which can sometimes build up an electrostatic charge that 
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the ants find repellent. Nests were illuminated by two fluorescent light fixtures 
suspended 37 cm above the bench on which all experiments were carried out. 
This provided even illumination of 1400 lux at the benchtop, as measured by a 
Lutron LX-101A light meter. Each fixture had a single 8000°K T-8 full-spectrum 
daylight bulb (All-Glass Aquarium). 
Subjects 
Thirty-two colonies of Temnothorax rugatulus were used for the colony-level 
tests. Half of them were small (20-80 workers) and half were large (150-250 
workers). An additional 8 medium-size colonies (100-130 workers) provided 16 
worker ants (two ants per colony) for the individual tests. Only a minority of 
workers in Temnothorax colonies participate actively in nest-site scouting and 
transport of nestmates and brood items, while the rest of the colony waits at the 
home nest (Mallon, Pratt, and Franks 2001; Pratt 2005b). In order to ensure that I 
tested only these active ants, I placed brood items outside of the colony’s nest 
and selected workers that attempted to retrieve them. I reasoned that ants willing 
to leave the nest and retrieve brood were likely to carry out similar tasks during 
colony emigrations (Sasaki and Pratt 2011).  
Colonies were collected in the Pinal Mountains near Globe, Arizona (N 33° 
19.00’, N 110° 52.56’, W). All had at least one queen, with worker populations 
ranging from 20 to 250 and brood populations ranging from 20 to 280. I estimate 
that 25 to 100 ants (one third of each colony’s worker population) actively 
participated in scouting, site assessment, and recruitment (Pinter-Wollman et al. 
2012). Each colony was housed in a nest like those described above, but without 
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any light filters. Each nest was kept in a plastic box (11 cm x 11 cm), the walls of 
which were coated with Fluon to prevent the ants from escaping. Each box was 
provided with a water-filled plastic tube capped with cotton and an agar-based 
diet that was refreshed weekly (Bhatkar and Whitcomb 1970). 
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Experimental procedure 
In each test, a subject (either an individual or a colony) was made to choose 
between a constant nest and a comparison nest. The comparison nest was 
always brighter than the constant nest, but its exact brightness varied across 
tests in order to provide an array of challenges of varying difficulty. Each subject 
was tested once for each of the seven comparison nests. The sequence of 
comparisons was varied across subjects to control for order effects. Four distinct 
orderings were used, with equal numbers of subjects assigned to each (Table 1S 
in Appendix A).  
Tests of individuals began with placement of a home nest against one wall of a 
rectangular plastic arena (17.8 x 12.7 cm) with Fluon-coated walls. Two brood 
items were deposited just outside the nest entrance and a single ant was placed 
in the arena. The ant was then given 12 hours to find the nest and to move the 
brood inside. This procedure ensured that the subject was aware of both the 
home nest and the brood items. Constant and comparison nests were then 
placed against the arena wall opposite from the home. To induce a move to one 
of these nests, the roof of the home nest was removed. The ant’s choice was 
assayed after 12 hours by recording the nest to which she had carried the brood 
items. Each of 16 individuals was to be tested 7 times (once for each comparison 
nest); however, two individuals died and one lost her mark (see below) during the 
experiment. Thus a total of 106 trials were conducted. In all trials, subjects 
successfully moved the brood items to the home nest, but twelve trials had to be 
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excluded from further analysis because the subject failed to move to a target 
nest. Between trials, subjects were returned to their original colony. Each subject 
was marked with a unique paint drop on its gaster so that it could be identified 
and retrieved for subsequent trials. Before each experiment, all glass slides were 
washed in a commercial dishwasher, and the experimental arena was cleaned 
with ethanol. Balsa slats were made fresh for each experiment and never re-
used. 
Tests of colonies followed a similar procedure. The colony in its old nest was 
placed next to a standard home nest in the center of the arena. The roof of the 
old nest was then removed to induce the colony to move into the home nest. In 
all cases, colonies finished migrating within 12 hours. Then, target nests were 
introduced, and the roof of the home nest was removed to force a choice 
between the targets. The colony’s choice was assayed by recording the nest to 
which a strong majority of colony members (> 90%) migrated. Each of 16 
colonies was tested 7 times with different comparison nests, for a total of 112 
trials. In 9 trials colonies split and in one trial the colony did not move to either 
target nest. These ten trials were not included in the analysis. Order effects were 
controlled as for the individual tests (Table 1S in Appendix A). 
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Figure 3.1. Experimental arena for sensory discrimination tests. In each trial, 
subjects started in the home nest and were induced to choose between the 
constant and comparison sites. The constant nest was the same in all tests, with 
a very dim and highly favored interior light level. The comparison nest was 
always brighter than the constant nest, but its exact brightness varied across 
tests in order to provide an array of challenges of varying difficulty. Nests 
consisted of a cavity cut into a wood partition, with a glass ceiling and floor. 
Cavity light level was modified by adding transparent neutral density filters to the 
ceiling. Numbers in parentheses indicate interior light levels.  
  
Constant nest 
(1 lux) 
Comparison nest 
(7, 14, 20, 28, 39,     
56 or 112 lux) 
Home nest  
(no roof; 1400 lux) 
2 cm 
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Figure 3.2. The proportion of correct choices made as a function of site 
illumination difference. (A) Colonies (red triangles) outperform individuals (blue 
circles) when the illumination difference is small (< 40 lux), but individuals 
perform better for larger illumination differences. (B) Large colonies (green 
circles) perform better than small colonies (yellow triangles) over the entire range 
of tested illumination differences, although this difference is not statistically 
 42 
significant. Thick lines represent fitting to the psychophysics function specified in 
equation 1, with parameters sampled from the Bayesian posterior distribution 
calculated from the data. Dashed lines give 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3.3. Proportion of simulated individuals and colonies (population 100) 
selecting the better of two nests. Colonies perform better when the quality 
difference between the nests is small, but individuals choose more accurately 
when the difference is greater. In the corresponding experiments, a nest’s quality 
is set by its brightness, with darker nests being more attractive. For these 
simulations, qA=0.20, and qB varies between 0.20 and 0.001. The quorum 
parameter c=1.1. 
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Chapter 4 
ANTS ADJUST ATTRIBUTE WEIGHTS ACCORDING TO PRIOR EXPERIENCE 
Abstract 
Evolutionary theory predicts that animals act to maximize their fitness when 
choosing among a set of options, such as what to eat or where to live. Making 
the best choice is challenging when options vary in multiple attributes, and 
animals have evolved a variety of heuristics to simplify the task. Many of these 
involve ranking or weighing attributes according to their importance. However, 
the importance of attributes can vary across time and place, hence animals might 
benefit by adjusting weights accordingly. Here I show that colonies of the ant 
Temnothorax rugatulus increase weights on more informative attributes through 
experience when choosing a nest site. These ants choose their rock crevice 
nests on the basis of multiple features, including entrance size and interior 
brightness. After exposure to an environment where one attribute better 
differentiated options than the other, colonies increased their reliance on the 
more informative attribute. Although many species show experience-based 
changes in selectivity based on a single feature, this is the first evidence in 
animals for adaptive changes in the weighting of multiple attributes. Our studies 
show that animal collectives, like individuals, change decision-making strategies 
according to experience. I discuss how collective-level flexibility emerges from 
individuals.  
Introduction 
Evolutionary theory predicts that animals act to maximize their fitness when 
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choosing among a set of options, such as what to eat or where to live. Decision-
making is relatively straightforward for simple options differing in only one 
attribute. For example, if two flower patches offer honeybees identical nectar but 
are found at different distances, the closer one, requiring less time and energy to 
exploit, should clearly be preferred. It becomes more difficult, however, if options 
vary in multiple ways, especially if no option is superior in all attributes. Thus for 
honeybees, if flowers offer different qualities and quantities of nectars at different 
distances, it becomes harder to determine the best choice.  
Decision-makers have a variety of ways to handle these situations, but many 
strategies involve ranking attributes (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). For 
example, the weighted additive strategy assigns a weight to each attribute 
according to its importance. An option’s value is determined by summing each 
attribute score multiplied by its weight, and the option with the highest total score 
is preferred. This strategy has been observed in many taxa, from insects to 
humans (Goldstein 1990; Seeley and Buhrman 1999; Franks, Mallon, et al. 
2003b). It is often assumed that weights do not change across different contexts 
(Goldstein 1990). However, because the validity of attributes can vary across 
time and place, animals might increase their fitness if they adjust weights 
accordingly (Goldstein 1990; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993; Weber and 
Borcherding 1993). For example, if bees live in an environment where all flowers 
have similar nectar quality but very different shapes (and thus different ease of 
access to nectar), do they learn to weigh shape more than nectar in judging each 
option?  
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I tested this hypothesis by studying nest site selection in the ant Temnothorax 
rugatulus. House-hunting in this genus is especially suited to such an analysis, 
because its nesting criteria and decision-making have been well-studied 
(Goldstein 1990; Seeley and Buhrman 1999; Mallon, Pratt, and Franks 2001; 
Franks, Mallon, et al. 2003b; Pratt and Sumpter 2006; Sasaki and Pratt 2012). 
Colonies typically live in natural cavities, such as fragile rock crevices, and are 
adept at collectively choosing a new home if their old nest becomes inadequate 
(Möglich 1978; Goldstein 1990; Pratt and Pierce 2001). Learning plays a role in 
emigration, with colonies improving their speed over repeated trials (Langridge, 
Franks, and Sendova-Franks 2004; Langridge, Sendova-Franks, and Franks 
2008) and retaining information about the quality of potential new homes in their 
vicinity (Stroeymeyt, Giurfa, and Franks 2010; Stroeymeyt et al. 2011; 
Stroeymeyt, Franks, and Giurfa 2011). Most importantly, colonies use a weighted 
additive strategy that ranks and integrates multiple site attributes, including 
interior light level, entrance size, and cavity floor area (Franks, Mallon, et al. 
2003b).  
In this study, I tested whether colonies of T. rugatulus adjust attribute weights 
according to experience. I first determined how a set of colonies weighed interior 
light level and entrance size, by giving them a choice that traded off these 
attributes. Then, the colonies were divided into two treatment conditions. In each 
condition, they repeatedly faced a binary nest choice, but in one treatment the 
options were distinguished only by entrance size, while in the other treatment 
they were distinguished only by light level. Finally, all colonies were again given 
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the original choice to test whether their experience had modified how they 
weighed the two attributes. If so, I predicted that colonies would increase the 
weight of the attribute that had been more informative in distinguishing options 
during the treatment period.  
Materials and methods  
Subjects 
I used sixty colonies of Temnothorax rugatulus. All had at least one queen, with 
worker populations ranging from 128 to 211 and brood populations ranging from 
46 to 302. See (Sasaki and Pratt 2011) for details of the collection site and 
laboratory habitat.  
Experimental procedure 
To measure how colonies weighed entrance size and interior light level before 
treatment, I performed binary preference tests between target nests E and L. 
Nest E had a smaller entrance than nest L (2 mm vs. 5.5 mm), but a brighter 
interior (525 lux vs. 2 lux). I chose these two attributes because Temnothorax 
colonies show a strong preference for smaller entrances and darker interiors 
(Pratt and Pierce 2001; Franks, Mallon, et al. 2003b; Pratt 2005a). I designed 
nests E and L to achieve roughly equal preference at the start (Sasaki and Pratt 
2011). That way, I could later detect treatment-induced changes in either 
direction. 
Before receiving the preference test, each colony was first moved from its 
original nest into a standard home nest with a 3.7 mm entrance and 245 lux light 
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level. This was done to minimize any effects of current home attributes on site 
preference (Healey and Pratt 2008). The empty home nest was placed against 
one wall of a small experimental arena with Fluon-coated walls (17.8 x 12.7 cm). 
Then, the colony in its original nest was introduced and forced to migrate by 
removal of the nest’s roof. All colonies successfully migrated within 12 hours. The 
original nest was then taken away and target nests E and L were placed against 
the arena wall opposite from the home nest. Finally, the roof of the home nest 
was removed to induce migration. I assayed nest-site preference by recording 
the site occupied by the colony 12 hours later. Colonies usually showed an 
unambiguous preference, but they sometimes split between sites. If one site 
contained over 90% of colony members, including all queens and brood items, I 
designated that as the colony’s choice. If no site achieved this criterion, I did not 
record a preference. This occurred for only 4 of the 60 colonies.  
In the treatment phase, colonies made a series of four choices. In each choice, 
they chose between one site identical to the standard home nest and another 
that was inferior to the home nest in one attribute, but identical to it in the other. 
For half the colonies, the inferior attribute was light level (1400 lux vs. 245 lux in 
the standard nest); for the other half, the inferior attribute was entrance size (9.5 
mm diameter vs. 3.7 mm in the standard nest). Colonies were always expected 
to choose the standard nest, regardless of treatment. In one treatment, however, 
this choice would be based on a difference in light level, while in the other it 
would be based on a difference in entrance size. To avoid any bias due to 
differences among colonies in how they weight the two attributes, I took account 
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of their initial preferences when assigning them to treatments. Half of the 
colonies that chose E were placed in the entrance treatment and the other half in 
the light treatment. Those that chose L were divided in a similar fashion. 
Prior to the first of the four choices, each colony was induced to move into a 
standard nest, as described above. Each choice usually ended with the colony 
moving to another standard nest, hence the ants did not have to be re-housed 
before the next choice. In a few cases (18 of 224 emigrations), they chose the 
alternative (inferior) nest, and had to be forced to migrate to the standard nest 
before the next choice, to ensure that all colonies experienced similar contexts 
during decision-making. In other respects, each choice followed the same 
procedure used in the initial preference test. Three days elapsed between 
choices, during which colonies remained in the emigration arena in the presence 
of the rejected inferior site. This was done to maximize colony exposure to the 
site, and any associated effects on their weighting of attributes. 
Once the treatment phase was complete, colonies were again presented with the 
original binary choice between sites E and L. This test measured how the 
treatment had affected the ants’ attribute weightings. Specifically, increases in 
the relative weighting of light level could be detected as an increase in 
preference for L, while increases in the weighting of entrance size could be 
detected as an increase in preference for E. Six colonies split either in the pre-
treatment or post-treatment tests and so were excluded from further analysis, 
 50 
leaving a total of 54 colonies. The complete experimental design is shown in 
Figure 4.1. 
Nest designs 
Each nest was made from a balsa wood slat sandwiched between glass 
microscope slides, with a circular cavity cut through the middle of the slat. A nest 
entrance was drilled through the center of the roof slide. Transparent neutral 
density filters were used to control the interior illumination. See (Sasaki and Pratt 
2011) for further details on nest design and our procedure for preparing and 
inducing emigrations.  
Analysis 
To compare preference shifts between conditions, I used a generalized linear 
model. Post-treatment choice was the response variable, and the treatment 
condition was a predictor variable. I also included pre-treatment choice as a 
predictor, in case colonies showed consistent differences in their preferences. I 
tested the null hypothesis that the preference between targets E and L after the 
treatment was independent of the type of treatment. The alternative hypothesis 
was that the two treatment types drive target preference in opposite directions, 
with E more popular following the entrance condition, and L more popular 
following the light condition. The statistical package R (v. 2.15.2) was used for all 
analyses. 
Results  
In both treatments, colonies shifted their preference toward the site favored by 
the more informative attribute (Table 4.1). Of the 26 colonies assigned to the 
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entrance treatment, only 10 chose nest E before the treatment, but this rose to 
17 after treatment. Conversely, for the 28 colonies in the light treatment, the 
number preferring L increased from 16 to 19.  A generalized linear model showed 
a significant effect of treatment on preference (odds ratio = 3.98, p = 0.018), but 
no effect of pre-treatment choice (odds ratio = 0.62, p = 0.41). When the model 
was re-fitted to exclude pre-treatment choice, the odds ratio for treatment was 
3.99. This means that the odds of choosing nest E after the entrance treatment 
(or nest L after the light treatment) were approximately four times greater than 
the odds of choosing E after the light treatment (or L after the entrance 
treatment). 
Discussion 
Our study shows for the first time that animals can change weights on option 
attributes according to their experience. Specifically, T. rugatulus colonies 
exposed to an environment where one attribute better differentiates options than 
another increase weighting of the more informative attribute. Past studies on 
animal decision-making have mainly focused on how experience affects a single 
attribute, particularly during mate choice (Bakker and Milinski 1991; Collins 1995; 
Wagner, Smeds, and Wiegmann 2001; Hutchinson 2005). For example, female 
fruit flies show less interest in intermediate-quality males after exposure to high-
quality males than after exposure to low-quality males (Dukas 2005). Studies like 
this have tested if decision-makers change their selectivity according to the 
average quality of options available in their environment. I instead created an 
environment where one attribute was more informative than another and showed 
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that colonies can adjust attribute weights to emphasize the more informative 
feature.  
Our results cannot easily be explained as a simple result of differing colony state 
following the two experimental conditions. Such effects are well known in 
foraging, where different treatments affect the state of the subject and thus its 
preferences (Schuck-Paim, Pompilio, and Kacelnik 2004). In fact, the quality of 
the current nest is known to influence emigration behavior by Temnothorax ants. 
Ants make faster moves, and possibly less discriminating choices, when 
abandoning a good nest that has just been destroyed than when leaving a 
similarly-treated poor nest (Healey and Pratt 2008). To avoid this effect, I took 
pains to ensure that colonies lived in identical nests in both the light and entrance 
size conditions. That is, the better option was always the standard home nest, 
and the only difference between conditions was the design of the inferior nest, 
which was rarely chosen. This design allowed us to eliminate any bias caused by 
the subject state and instead to test how the contrast between options affected 
later decisions. 
Effects of prior experience on attribute weights have previously been explored in 
humans (Goldstein 1990; Lenton, Fasolo, and Todd 2009). For example, as the 
range of values taken by an attribute widens, its weight increases (Weber and 
Borcherding 1993). Our results are consistent with these findings. When I varied 
the quality of one attribute across options but kept the other the same, I found 
that the attribute with the wider range became more heavily weighted. I further 
showed that this weight modification persists over time, affecting decisions in a 
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new environment. Past studies typically exposed subjects to different choice 
environments and measured weights within these distinct environments. I tested 
all subjects in a common context, with exactly the same choice set, after 
exposing them to different environments. Thus, I can conclude that the observed 
changes in attribute weightings were due to past experience, rather than the 
environment at the time of choosing.  
What could be the benefit of flexible weights? Because the environment can 
change across time and place, reliability of attributes is not constant. 
Temnothorax colonies, for example, might find themselves in a dense forest 
thoroughly covered by a thick canopy and thus uniformly dark, or they might 
instead live in a younger, more open forest where some areas are much darker 
than others. Because light level is more important in distinguishing better from 
worse sites in the latter environment, ants may gain fitness by increasing the 
weight for this attribute. As another benefit, decisions can be improved by simply 
ignoring less informative attributes, thus reducing the amount of information that 
must be considered (Gigerenzer, Todd, and Group 1999). Because decision-
making based on multiple attributes is cognitively demanding, larger numbers of 
attributes can paradoxically lead to cognitive overload and inferior decisions 
(Schwartz 1986; Sasaki and Pratt 2012). Theories predict and experiments have 
shown that focusing on only the most important attribute can improve speed and 
accuracy (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1999), two 
important factors for animal decision-making (Chittka, Skorupski, and Raine 
2009). 
 54 
Studies on prior experience and decision-making have typically focused on 
solitary animals (Schuck-Paim, Pompilio, and Kacelnik 2004; Stephens, Brown, 
and Ydenberg 2008; Shettleworth 2009). Our work shows that experience also 
matters for collectives, as recent studies showed in Temnothorax ants (Healey 
and Pratt 2008; Langridge, Sendova-Franks, and Franks 2008; Sasaki and Pratt 
2011; Stroeymeyt et al. 2011). Unlike solitary animals, social insects typically 
cooperate to evaluate options and make collective decisions. This leaves open 
the question of how the colony-level flexibility that I observed emerges from 
individual behavior. One scenario is that, like the colony, individuals compare the 
two sites, detect the difference in one attribute, and then change weights 
accordingly. Alternatively, decision-making strategies might be very different at 
the individual and collective levels. For example, when individuals encounter a 
nest with low quality for a particular attribute, they might simply increase the 
weight for this attribute, known as the scarcity effect in psychology (Worchel, 
Lee, and Adewole 1975). This strategy would not require direct comparison by 
individuals, but it would lead to comparison by the colony as a whole. Future 
work should investigate exactly how experience affects the behavior of individual 
colony members. Studies such as these will allow us to decipher the underlying 
mechanism of the collective-level flexibility. 
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Figure 4.1. Experimental assessment of the effect of experience on attribute 
weights. An initial binary choice between sites E and L showed how colonies 
weighted entrance size and interior light level. Colonies then made a series of 
four choices in which only one attribute provided distinguishing information. In 
each choice, they chose between a standard nest (S) and another that was 
inferior to the standard nest in one attribute, but identical to it in the other. For 
half the colonies, the inferior attribute was light (IL); for the other half it was 
entrance size (IE). Finally, colonies repeated the original choice to determine 
whether experience had altered their preferences. 
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Table 4.1. Nest site preferences of colonies before and after treatment conditions 
in which either entrance or light level were informative for decision-making. 
Results are shown as contingency tables classifying each colony by its choices 
before and after treatment. In each treatment, colonies shifted their preference 
toward the option favored by the more informative attribute. E and L stand for the 
small entrance nest and the darker nest, respectively.     
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation investigated the ultimate and proximate explanations of 
collective cognition. At the ultimate level, I compared cognitive abilities of 
Temnothorax colonies and individuals to test whether groups have an advantage. 
I first confirmed that isolated individuals make decisions by comparing available 
nests (Chapter 2). This finding allowed me to give the same cognitive tasks to 
individuals and colonies and directly compare their performance. My studies 
confirmed superior collective cognition: while individual ants frequently make 
irrational decisions, colonies are overwhelmingly rational as a whole (Appendix 
B), colonies have higher information-processing power than individuals 
(Appendix C), and colonies have more precise sensory discrimination than 
individuals (Chapter 3). In the study of Chapter 4, however, when the task was 
easy, individuals actually outperformed colonies.  
These results demonstrated novel advantages of group living. It has been shown 
that individuals can gain benefits in many ways by forming a group (Krause and 
Ruxton 2002). For example, black-headed gulls capture food more easily when 
they hunt in flocks than when foraging by themselves (Gotmark, Winkler, and 
Anderson 1986), a pride of lions can better defend a hunting territory than a 
single lion can (Packer, Scheel, and Pusey 1990), a cluster of male emperor 
penguins can conserve their energy much more efficiently than isolated ones 
(Ancel et al. 1997), and females of lekking species prefer to mate with males in a 
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group (Wiley 1973). My research shows a very different kind of benefit to group 
living: improved cognition. Although all my studies were conducted in the 
laboratory, the superior cognitive abilities of groups should also be beneficial in 
nature, where nest site selection is likely a frequent and important task for colony 
survival and reproduction (Möglich 1978; Herbers 1989; Foitzik and Heinze 
1998). Future work is required to investigate exactly when and how the collective 
advantages are used in their natural habitat. 
At the proximate level, I investigated the underlying mechanisms of these 
collective phenomena. I found that colonies achieved rationality (Appendix B) 
and higher information-processing power (Appendix C) by sharing the burden of 
nest assessment among members. The mathematical model in Chapter 3 shows 
that positive feedback between group members effectively integrates information 
and sharpens discrimination of fine differences. When the task is easier, 
however, the same positive feedback can lock the colony into a suboptimal 
choice.  
My studies investigated several cognitive tasks, in which collective cognition 
succeeds or fails.  Although collective cognition should theoretically be superior 
(Condorcet 1785; Simons 2004), many examples of collective failure have been 
documented (Bahrami et al. 2012). There are at least two problems with the 
underlying assumptions of the theories. The first problem is that they typically 
ignore or simplify individual cognitive abilities and conclude that groups always 
have superior cognition (Bonabeau, Dorigo, and Theraulaz 1999). However, it 
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has been shown that these abilities are often more complex than assumed 
(Gould 1990; Menzel and Giurfa 2001b; Seeley 2002). The second problem is 
that theories assume that individual assessments are made in isolation, and then 
integrated by a centralized process such as vote counting or averaging. Real 
groups instead rely on decentralized mechanisms in which interactions and 
positive feedback bring the group to consensus (Sumpter 2010). The violation of 
these assumptions suggests that groups may not make better decisions than 
individuals under certain circumstances. In this dissertation research, I overcame 
the challenges described above using the house-hunting Temnothorax ant, which 
provides a detailed understanding of individual cognitive abilities and of 
information transfer among group members.  
Recent studies noted the similarities between information processing of a social 
insect colony and that of the brain (Hofstadter 1999; Passino, Seeley, and 
Visscher 2008; Marshall and Franks 2009; Mitchell 2009). It has further been 
suggested that both systems achieve statistically optimal decision-making 
(Marshall et al. 2009). Emergent processes of individual cognition have been a 
major topic in many fields, including psychology and biology, but they remain 
largely unknown. This is partially because neurons are connected in a very 
complex way and it is hard to untangle or manipulate them. The workers of a 
social insect colony are, on the other hand, much less tightly integrated. This 
difference makes it straightforward to isolate individual insects (Chapter 2) and to 
manipulate colony organization by adding and removing certain individuals 
(Wilson 1980). By taking advantage of these parallels between a colony and a 
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brain, future studies can use social insect colonies for deeper understanding of 
emergent processes of cognition.  
One may wonder if I can measure individual cognition by testing isolated social 
insects, because this unnatural setting may alter their internal states. For 
example, isolated ants may look for their nestmates instead of new sites, making 
their site choices arbitrary and worse than that of colonies. However, my studies 
show that these individuals make consistent decisions, which are as good as or 
even better than colonies under certain circumstances (Sasaki and Pratt 2011; 
Sasaki and Pratt 2012; Sasaki et al. 2013). Thus, social insects can efficiently 
solve cognitive tasks even when they are isolated from their colony members. In 
fact, much has been learned about individual cognition of social insects by 
isolating them. Studies of isolated honeybees have made them into a major 
model system for animal cognition, including, perception, learning, memory and 
decision-making (Gould 1990; Smith 1993; Menzel and Giurfa 2001b; Wright et 
al. 2013). Therefore, testing individual cognition of social insects by isolating 
them is not just a valid but also powerful method.  
For over a century, collective cognition has been investigated empirically and 
theoretically, I still know little of when and how groups make better or worse 
decisions than individuals. My dissertation research investigated this relatively 
unexplored question using the house-hunting Temnothorax ant. Because these 
ants can process information both individually and collectively, I was able to 
directly compare the cognitive abilities of individuals and groups by giving them 
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the same cognitive tasks. I hope that these techniques and results help the field 
move forward towards better understanding of collective cognition.   
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Materials and methods 
 
Fig. S1. Nest design used in discrimination experiments. 
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Table S1. Test orderings used in the individual and colony experiments. The 
number in each cell is the interior light level of the comparison nest (lux). Groups 
1 and 2 progressed from mid-range values to more extreme ones, while groups 3 
and 4 progressed in the opposite direction. Each group included an equal 
number of subjects.   
 
 Order in sequence of trials 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Group 1 28 39 20 56 14 7 112 
Group 2 28 20 39 56 14 112 7 
Group 3 7 112 14 56 20 39 28 
Group 4 112 7 56 14 39 20 28 
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Fitting the psychophysical function  
I fitted a sigmoidal psychophysical function (Equation 1) to the experimental 
results. I hypothesized that colonies will perform better than individuals at lower 
illumination differences, but worse at higher differences. This could manifest itself 
by colonies having a lower threshold α and a lower asymptotic discrimination 
level λ. To fit the function I used the data from colonies or individuals to infer the 
Bayesian posterior distribution of the three model parameters, θ = {α, β, λ}. 
 
 
P θ D( ) = P D θ( )P θ( )P D( )  (S1) 
Here D is the data, P(D | θ) is the likelihood, calculated using equation 1 applied 
to each decision, and P(θ) is a prior distribution of the possible parameters, which 
I take as uniform over the range ([0 0 0], [100 100, 1]). P(D) is a normalizing 
constant that does not need to be calculated. 
I acquire samples of parameter values from this posterior distribution using 
Metropolis-Hastings Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling (MacKay, 
2003; Metropolis, Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, Teller, & Teller, 1953). This provides 
100,000 parameter samples in proportion to the posterior probability of those 
parameter values. I can use these parameter samples directly to calculate P(tc<ti 
| Dc, Di) and P(λc>λi | Dc, Di), where Dc and Di are the colony and individual data, 
respectively. Over 100,000 iterations I pick (with replacement) a random sample 
from the colony parameter samples and compare it to another randomly picked 
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sample from the individual samples. I ask in what proportion of cases the above 
inequalities hold, and calculate our p-value directly from this (Fig. S2). I can also 
use the parameter samples to produce a `best fit’ curve (thick lines in Fig. 2) to 
the observed proportions, by summing over the possible parameter values. For 
example, 
 
€ 
P(correct choice |  D) = P(correct choice |  θ) ∫ P(θ |  D)dθ ≈ P(correct choice |  θ j )
j
∑  
where θj is the jth parameter sample. 
I can also calculate the variance of this estimate and thus provide 95% 
confidence intervals (dotted lines in Fig. 2). The `best fit’ yc, to the colony data is 
significantly greater (at 5%) than the individual data when 
€ 
(yc − yi) >1.64 Var(yc ) +Var(yi) , where 1.64 comes from this being a 1-sided 
test. The inequality can be reversed to find when yi is significantly greater than yc.  
A similar approach was used to compare the performance of large and small 
colonies. 
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Figure S2. Posterior distribution of the threshold parameter α and the asymptotic 
parameter λ of the psychophysical function. Box plots indicate the distribution of 
parameter samples from Metropolis-Hastings MCMC, fitting equation 1 to the 
data. (a) Distribution of the threshold parameter, α, for colonies (C) and 
individuals (I). Colonies have a lower threshold value, indicating better 
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performance at low illumination differences. (b) Distribution of the asymptotic 
parameter λ. Individuals have a higher asymptotic level, indicating better 
performance for large illumination differences. (c) Distribution of α for large (L) 
and small (S) colonies. (d) Distribution of the saturation parameter for large and 
small colonies. No significant effect of colony size was found for either parameter 
(λ small =0.77, λ large =0.84; Monte Carlo test for λ large < λ small, p = 0.84; a small =12.4 
lux, a large = 10.8; Monte Carlo test for a large < a small, p = 0.43). 
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Testing the model prediction 
To test the model prediction that colonies perform better at difficult choices but 
individuals do better for easier ones, twenty colonies and twenty individuals were 
tested for one difficult and one easy choice as additional data points. The 
experimental procedure was identical to the one described above except that it 
used different comparison nests: 4 lux and 80 lux in the difficult and easy 
choices, respectively.  Half of the subjects in each group were first tested for the 
difficult choice and then for the easy choice. The other half were tested in the 
opposite order. All colonies were medium size, with 90-130 workers. Figure S3 
shows the results, which are further described in the main text. 
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Fig. S3. (a) The proportion of correct choices made as a function of site 
illumination difference, including both the original data and two new data points. 
(b) The statistical results show even stronger support for the better performance 
of groups on difficult tasks and similar results for the better performance of 
individuals on easy tasks. 
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Markov chain model 
A Markov chain model was used to describe the Temnothorax house hunting 
process. In the model, each ant begins in the Exploring state from which she can 
find one of the two nests, entering state A, corresponding to the better nest, or B, 
corresponding to the worse nest. If she fails to find either nest, the ant continues 
exploring. With each subsequent nest visit, the ant enters state CAi or CBi, where 
i represents the number of comparisons she has made between nests. This i is 
incremented each time the ant goes from A to B, or from B to A. At each state the 
ant has a probability of committing to the nest she is currently assessing. Once 
she commits to a nest, she enters final state a or b. See Table S2 for a summary 
of model states, Table S3 for the model's transition probabilities, and Table S4 
for a description of the model parameters. The flowchart in Figure S4 
summarizes all possible state transitions. 
The probability of an ant committing to a particular nest is a function of the nest’s 
intrinsic quality q and the number of times she has compared it with the other 
nest (Equation 2). This relationship was based on observations of isolated ants 
choosing between a good and a mediocre nest. The probability of choosing 
correctly after multiple nest visits grew with the number of visits (Fig. S5). Under 
equation 2, the probability of committing to the good nest remains constant, but 
the probability of committing to the poor nest decreases with each comparison. 
This assumption implies that the accept probability increases faster when the 
quality difference between the nests is large. Equation 3 combines this 
mechanism with the quorum rule employed by ants in the presence of nestmates 
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(Pratt, Mallon, Sumpter, & Franks, 2002). Under this rule, the probability of 
committing to a site increases in a step-like way with site population. For the 
purpose of calculating the populations of each nest (NA and NB), I added the 
number of ants in final state a to 20% of the ants in states A and CAi. This 
reflects the approximate percentage of time actually spent by those ants inside 
the nest, where they can contribute to another ant’s assessment of quorum 
attainment. A colony is considered to have chosen nest A when more than half of 
the ants are in state a.  
When simulated in Matlab, the model produced results consistent with those 
observed in the experiments. Both colonies and individuals improved their 
performance as the problem became easier. Larger colonies were better able to 
solve problems for the entire range of difficulty (see Figure S6). For more difficult 
problems, colonies were able to select the better nest more accurately and faster 
than individuals. However, for a range of parameter values, individuals were able 
to outperform colonies for the easiest problems (Fig. 3). The initial ratio of nest 
qualities and the weight assigned to the quorum factor for colonies both have an 
effect on the individuals' ability to perform better than colonies in the simulations. 
When the quorum weight factor c is high (c>1), colonies get locked into their nest 
choices very quickly, leading to more suboptimal decisions for the entire range of 
problem difficulties. For low values of c, the crowds are always able to 
outperform individuals (Fig. S7). 
Our model further shows a tradeoff between speed and accuracy for easy 
choices: individuals take longer but make more accurate decisions than colonies. 
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In contrast, for difficult choices, colonies make decisions both faster and more 
accurately. Colonies achieve this by sharing the burden of nest assessment 
among members (Fig. S8). 
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Fig. S4. Summary of all possible states and transitions in the Markov chain 
model. 
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Figure S5. Proportion of individuals choosing the good nest as a function of the 
number of nest visits they make in the experiments (a) and in the simulation (b). 
In the model, the particular pair of nests used to generate the figure have 
qA=0.20 and qB=0.13. 
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Figure S6. Proportion of individuals and colonies (size 100) selecting the better of 
two nests in the simulation over 1,000,000 simulation runs. In this figure, 
qA=0.20, and qB varies between 0.20 and 0. The quorum parameter c=1.1. 
Colonies perform better when the quality difference between the nests is small, 
but individuals choose more accurately when the difference is greater. In 
experiments, a nest’s quality is expressed by its brightness, with darker nests 
being more attractive. 
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Figure S7. Results of model simulation for different values of parameter c, 
controlling the strength of the quorum effect in colonies selecting their nests. 
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Figure S8. Speed-accuracy trade-off between simulated individuals and colonies 
(size 100) choosing between two nests given an easy (qA=0.20, qB=0.005) and a 
difficult (qA=0.20, qB=0.19) problem. For the difficult problem, colonies are able to 
make their choice faster and with greater accuracy. For the easy problem, the 
colonies still choose faster, but individuals choose with greater accuracy. 
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Table S2. States of the Markov chain model. 
State Meaning 
E Exploring: no nests visited 
A Only nest A has been visited 
B Only nest B has been visited 
CAi Both nests have been visited; i comparisons have been 
made 
CBi Both nests have been visited; i comparisons have been 
made 
a Final state: nest A has been accepted 
b Final state: nest B has been accepted 
 
 90 
Table S3. Transition matrix of the Markov chain model. 
 
Stat
e 
E A B CA1 CB1 CA2 CB2 … a b 
E r (1-r)fA (1-r)fB 0 0 0 0 … 0 0 
A 0 (1-
gB)(1-
hA0) 
0 0 gB(1-
hA0) 
0 0 … hA
0 
0 
B 0 0 (1-
gA)(1-
hB0) 
gB(1-
hB0) 
0 0 0 … 0 hB
0 
CA1 0 0 0 (1-
gB)(1-
hA1) 
0 0 gB(1-
hA1) 
… hA
1 
0 
CB1 0 0 0 0 (1-
gA)(1-
hB1) 
gB(1-
hB1) 
0 … 0 hB
1 
… … … … … … … … … … … 
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Table S4. Markov chain model parameters. 
  
  
Parameter/ 
Expression 
Meaning/ 
Value 
i Number of comparisons between nests A and B 
r Probability of not finding either nest from the Exploring state, 
r=0.5 
fA Probability of initially finding nest A, fa=0.5 
fB Probability of initially finding nest B, fb=0.5 
gA Probability of finding nest A from the current nest, ga=0.5 
gB Probability of finding nest B from the current nest, gb=0.5 
qA Quality of nest A, indicated by the initial probability of accepting 
A, qa=0.2 
qB Quality of nest B, indicated by the initial probability of accepting 
A, qa is varied during the simulation to indicate difficulty of choice 
pA(i) Probability of accepting nest A by a single ant after i 
comparisons of the nests 
pB(i) Probability of accepting nest B by a single ant after i 
comparisons of the nests 
hA(i) Probability of accepting nest A by an ant after i comparisons, 
taking into account the quorum effect 
hB(i) Probability of accepting nest B by an ant after i comparisons, 
taking into account the quorum effect 
N Total number of ants in the colony. In the model runs, N=100 for 
small colonies, and N=200 for large colonies 
NA Number of ants that have accepted nest A 
NB Number of ants that have accepted nest B 
T Threshold parameter, T=0.2*N 
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Evolutionary theory predicts that animal decision makers should be rational, meaning that they consistently choose fitness-
maximizing options. Despite this, violations of rationality have been found repeatedly in humans and other animals. The
significance of these violations remains controversial, but many explanations point to cognitive limitations that prevent animals
from adequately processing the information needed for fully rational choice. Instead, they rely on heuristics that usually work
well but yield systematic errors in specific contexts. Although past research on rationality has focused on individuals, many highly
integrated groups, such as ant colonies, regularly make consensus choices among food sources, nest sites, or other options. These
collective choices emerge from local interactions among many group members, none of whom take on the whole burden of
decision making. We hypothesized that groups may evade the irrational consequences of individual limitations by distributing
their decision making across many group members. We tested this in the well-studied case of collective nest-site selection by
Temnothorax ants. We found that individual ants, but not colonies, strongly violated rationality when presented with a challenging
nest-site choice. Specifically, isolated individuals irrationally switched their preference between 2 alternative nest sites based on
their experience of an unattractive decoy. Given the same choice, intact colonies maintained consistent preferences regardless of
the decoy’s presence. Previous studies have stressed how distributed decision making can filter out random errors made by group
members. Our results show that collectives can also suppress systematic errors that emerge from the decision heuristics of
cognitively limited individuals. Key words: collective cognition, dynamic systems, decision-making, rationality. [Behav Ecol]
In its original economic setting, rational choice theory pre-dicts behavior under the assumption that humans act
to maximize utility, an implicit measure of net benefit (von
Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). Applied to behavioral
ecology, the theory makes an analogous assumption that nat-
ural selection has shaped animal decision making to maxi-
mize fitness (Stephens and Krebs 1986; Kacelnik 2006). This
predicts the evolution of rational animals that rate options ac-
cording to their fitness benefits and always choose the one with
the highest value. The obvious test of this prediction—compar-
ing the fitness outcomes of chosen and rejected options—is
generally impractical. Instead, rationality is assessed by looking
for adherence to certain consistency principles implied by max-
imization. For example, a preference for option A over option
B should not be altered by addition of a third option, which is
less preferred than either A or B. Immunity to such decoys is
a hallmark of rationality known as independence from irrele-
vant alternatives (IIA) (Rieskamp et al. 2006).
Despite these predictions, violations of IIA and other ratio-
nality principles have been observed repeatedly in humans and
other animals (Tversky 1969; Huber et al. 1982; Wedell 1991;
Shafir et al. 2002; Bateson et al. 2003). Irrationality typically
arises in challenging decisions involving options with multiple
attributes such that no option is clearly superior in all attrib-
utes. In the decoy effect, for example, irrational shifts in pref-
erence are seen with addition of a decoy option that is clearly
inferior to one target option but not to another (i.e., the
decoy is asymmetrically dominated) (Huber et al. 1982).
The decoy itself is rarely chosen, but its presence typically
increases preference for the dominating target. Such an in-
crease violates the principle of regularity, which holds that an
option’s popularity should not be increased by the addition of
new options to the choice set (Rieskamp et al. 2006).
Rationality violations seem to cast doubt on the optimizing
power of natural selection, but an alternative explanation
points to the influence of constraints unrecognized by classical
rational choice theory. This classical theory assumes that deci-
sion makers have unlimited cognitive resources, but real
animals operate under strong constraints both in the infor-
mation they possess and the means to process it (Simon
1982). These constraints may select for simple heuristics or
rules of thumb that economize on computation by either ex-
cluding information or processing it imperfectly (Gigerenzer
and Todd 1999, 2000; Hutchinson and Gigerenzer 2005). In
particular, it may be easier for an animal to compare the
options in a choice set than it is to estimate the absolute
fitness value of each one (Tversky and Simonson 1993; Shafir
1994; Bateson et al. 2003; Bateson and Healy 2005). In the
decoy effect, only the dominant target is a clear winner in
any pairwise comparison, thus enhancing its attractiveness to
individuals using comparative heuristics. Selection may favor
these heuristics if they work well in commonly encountered
natural settings. However, these same rules may fail in cer-
tain predictable contexts, like the experimental paradigms
that reliably yield irrational choice (Ariely 2008; Livnat and
Pippenger 2008).
If comparative heuristics lie behind irrational choice, then
a different pattern may arise in the collective decisions of
highly integrated groups, such as insect societies. In these
‘‘superorganisms,’’ selection at the group level has yielded
sophisticated colony-level adaptations, including the ability
to reach consensus on the best of several options. A colony’s
choice arises in a highly decentralized way without the need
for direct comparisons between options by individual ants
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(Couzin et al. 2005; Pratt and Sumpter 2006; Seeley et al.
2006; Ho¨lldobler and Wilson 2008; Gordon 2010). The pro-
cess is well illustrated by nest-site selection in Temnothorax ants,
which typically live in preformed natural cavities, such as rock
crevices or hollow nuts (Franks et al. 2002; Pratt et al. 2005;
Pratt and Sumpter 2006; Robinson et al. 2009). In the labo-
ratory, colonies thrive in artificial cavity nests made of glass
and wood or cardboard. When presented with 2 such nests of
different design, a homeless colony can assess each on the
basis of multiple attributes and emigrate to the better one
(Pratt and Pierce 2001; Franks, Mallon, et al. 2003). This de-
cision arises from a complex algorithm based on competition
between recruitment efforts by scout ants, few of which assess
more than one candidate (Mallon et al. 2001; Pratt et al. 2005;
Pratt and Sumpter 2006; Robinson et al. 2009). In a study of 9
emigrations by T. albipennis, for example, only 27% of scouts
visited both sites in time to influence the colony’s decision
(Robinson et al. 2009). The majority with knowledge of only
one site nonetheless drive the decision process because they
start to bring nest mates to their site with a probability that
depends on its quality (Mallon et al. 2001; Pratt 2005). As
a result, population growth at the better site outstrips its com-
petitor, ultimately making it the colony’s choice.
We hypothesized that this highly distributed mechanism
may save colonies from the irrational consequences of compar-
ative heuristics. This is because a colony’s choice emerges from
the behavior of many ants that have each assessed only a single
site and thus have no opportunity to make comparisons. Con-
sistent with this idea, an earlier study found that colonies of
T. curvispinosus choosing among nest sites were immune to
the decoy effect (Edwards and Pratt 2009). Likewise, house-
hunting colonies of T. albipennis were found to show transi-
tive preferences, fulfilling another expectation of rationality
(Franks, Mallon, et al. 2003). These studies, however, looked
only at the decisions of whole colonies and not those of in-
dividual ants. Thus, the colony’s immunity did not necessarily
reflect the suppression of individual errors. It may instead
have been a simple result of the particular set of options
presented. For example, the trade-off between targets may
have been too weak, allowing a strong preference for one
target to mask or eliminate smaller decoy effects.
In this study, we carried out a direct test of the hypothesis
that collective decision making can eliminate the irrational
errors to which individuals are vulnerable. To do this, we chal-
lenged both colonies and isolated individuals of T. rugatulus
with the decoy effect taking care that the target options were
closely balanced in attractiveness to maximize the decision
challenge. We predicted that a lone ant required to select a site
by herself would be vulnerable to the same irrational out-
comes seen in solitary animals. A colony, in contrast, should
be rationally consistent because it does not rely on compar-
isons by individuals.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Nest designs
To test for the decoy effect, we designed 2 target nests A and B
that posed a trade-off between entrance size and interior illu-
mination. These attributes are important to Temnothorax, with
colonies showing a strong preference for smaller entrances
and darker interiors (Pratt and Pierce 2001; Franks, Mallon,
et al. 2003; Pratt 2005). Nest A had a smaller entrance than
nest B (2 vs. 5.5 mm) but a brighter interior (525 vs. 2 lux).
We settled on these particular designs through a series of
preference tests with different candidates until we found a pair
of targets for which ants showed roughly equal preference. We
also designed 2 asymmetrically dominated decoy nests. Decoy
DA was dominated by A but not by B: It shared A’s entrance
size, but it had a brighter less preferred interior (1400 lux),
and it was not dominated by B because of the latter’s larger
less preferred entrance size. Decoy DB, in contrast, was dom-
inated by B but not by A: It equaled B in illumination but
trailed it in entrance size (9.5 mm), and it was not dominated
by A because of the latter’s brighter less preferred interior.
Figure 1 summarizes the dominance relationships between
targets and decoys.
Each nest was made from a balsa wood slat (2.4-mm thick)
sandwiched between glass microscope slides (50 3 75 mm). A
circular cavity (38-mm diameter) was cut through the middle
of the slat, and a round entrance hole was drilled through the
center of the roof. The roof was composed of 2 identical slides
stacked on top of one another. Interior illumination was ad-
justed by placing transparent neutral density filters (Rosco
Cinegel) between the roof slides. This design prevented ants
from directly contacting the filters, which can sometimes
build up an electrostatic charge that the ants find repellent.
All filters had a 9.5-mm diameter hole to accommodate the
nest entrance. Consistent hole size ensured that illumination
was independent of entrance size.
Nests were illuminated by 2 fluorescent light fixtures sus-
pended 37 cm above the bench on which all experiments were
carried out. This provided even illumination of 1400 lux at the
benchtop as measured by a Lutron LX-101A light meter. Each
fixture had a single 8000 !K T-8 full-spectrum daylight bulb
(Aqueon Products All-Glass Aquarium, Franklin, WI).
Subjects
Fifty-three colonies of T. rugatulus were used for the colony-
level tests. An additional 6 colonies provided 53 worker ants
for the individual tests. Only a minority of workers in Temno-
thorax colonies participate actively in nest-site scouting and
transport of nest mates and brood items, whereas the rest of
the colony waits at the home nest (Mallon et al. 2001; Pratt
2005). In order to ensure that we tested only these active ants,
we placed brood items outside of the colony’s nest and
selected workers that attempted to retrieve them. We rea-
soned that ants willing to leave the nest and retrieve brood
were likely to carry out similar tasks during colony emigration.
Colonies were collected in the Pinal Mountains near Globe,
Arizona. All had at least one queen, with worker populations
ranging from 120 to 250 and brood populations ranging from
8 to 90. Each colony was housed in a nest like those described
above but with a small entrance (2.0-mm diameter) and no
light filter. Each nest was kept in a plastic box (113 11 cm),
the walls of which were coated with Fluon to prevent the ants
Figure 1
Attributes of nests used in preference tests. The choice between
target nests A and B imposes a trade-off in 2 attributes: A is better
than B in regard to entrance size but B is better than A in regard to
darkness. Decoy nests DA and DB are asymmetrically dominated by
the targets: DA is clearly worse than A but not B, whereas DB is clearly
worse than B but not A.
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from escaping. Each box was provided with a water-filled plas-
tic tube capped with cotton and an agar-based diet that was
refreshed weekly (Bhatkar and Whitcomb 1970).
Individual experiment
We first performed binary preference tests between targets A
and B to confirm that the trade-off between entrance size and
cavity illumination posed a significant decision-making chal-
lenge. If so, we predicted that each nest design would be
chosen roughly half the time. The 2 nests were placed adja-
cent to one another against one wall of a small experimental
arena with Fluon-coated walls (17.8 3 12.7 cm). We placed 3
brood items inside each nest and then introduced a single test
subject into the arena. The subject was placed on the arena
floor near the center of the wall opposite to the location of
the nests. To determine her preference, we took advantage of
the tendency of ants to gather scattered brood into a preferred
location (Franks and Sendova-Franks 1992). The ant’s choice
was assayed after 12 h by recording the site to which she had
carried all 6 brood items. In this and all other preference
tests, the position of the target nests was randomized to con-
trol for directional bias.
We then used a similar procedure to determine whether the
presence of a decoy site changes preference between A and B.
The procedure was modified to ensure that each subject expe-
rienced the decoy nest before making her choice. We first
placed the decoy nest alone in the arena against one wall.
We then deposited 3 brood items just outside the entrance
of the decoy and introduced a single test subject to the arena.
The arena was checked periodically to see whether the ant
had moved the brood inside. All ants did so within 12 h,
confirming that they had experienced the decoy. After this,
the procedure was identical to the binary choice experiment.
Target sites A and B, each containing 3 brood items, were
placed near the center of the arena wall opposite from the
decoy. Preferences were assayed after 12 h by recording
the site that contained all 9 brood items (the 6 in the target
nests as well as the 3 from the decoy nest). We used this 2-stage
method rather than simultaneous presentation of all 3 op-
tions because the latter approach leaves open the possibility
that the ant makes a decision without first visiting the decoy,
thus undermining the essential condition for testing the
decoy effect.
Twenty ants were given the binary choice between A and B;
16 were tested with decoy DA, and 17 with decoy DB. Each ant
was tested only once. No ant ever chose the decoy. Nine ants
did not choose a nest (2 in the binary test, 2 in the presence of
decoy DA, and 5 in the presence of decoy DB) and so were
excluded from the analysis.
Colony experiment
To confirm that colonies showed similar preferences to those
of individuals, we performed binary preference tests between
targets A and B. The procedure was identical to that for indi-
viduals except that all members of the colony, rather than
a single ant, were removed from their home nest and depos-
ited in a test arena containing the target sites.
Then, to test the effect of decoys on whole colonies, we used
a similar procedure to that for individual ants. First, a colony
was introduced to the experimental arena in its home nest, and
an empty decoy nest (either DA or DB) was placed nearby. The
colony was then induced to migrate to the decoy by removing
the roof of its home nest. All colonies successfully migrated
within 12 h. Target nests A and B were then placed against the
arena wall opposite from the decoy. In contrast to the individ-
ual experiment, the roof of the decoy was removed to induce
migration. We assayed nest-site preference by recording the
site occupied by the colony 12 h later. Colonies usually showed
an unambiguous preference, but they sometimes split be-
tween sites. If one site contained more than 90% of colony
members, including all queens and brood items, we desig-
nated that as the colony’s choice. If no site achieved this
criterion, we did not record a preference. This occurred only
8 times out of 60 migrations. Thirty colonies were tested, each
one receiving both the DA and the DB treatments in counter-
balanced order.
Preparation
Before each experiment, all glass slides were washed with dish
soap and rinsed with distilled water. Light filters were gently
wiped with ethanol, and the experimental arena was cleaned
with ethanol. Balsa slats were made fresh for each experiment
and never reused.
Analysis
Preferences in the binary choice were assayed with a binomial
test. The presence of a decoy effect was tested with a v2 test of
independence. That is, we tested the null hypothesis that
the preference between targets A and B was independent of
the type of decoy present. The alternative hypothesis was that
the 2 decoy types drive target preference in opposite direc-
tions with DA making A more popular and DB making B more
popular. The statistical package R (v. 2.9.0) was used for all
analyses, and Yate’s continuity correction was applied in all
v2 tests.
RESULTS
Individual ants show irrational preference shifts
In the binary choice between A and B, individual ants showed
no strong preference for either site, with 9 choosing A and 9
choosing B (2-tailed binomial test: P ¼ 1.0). This result con-
firmed that the trade-off between entrance size and dimness
posed the desired decision-making challenge to individuals.
In the presence of an asymmetrically dominated decoy, how-
ever, the preference between A and B was significantly altered.
Target A was preferred to B in the presence of DA, but B was
preferred to A in the presence of DB (v
2 ¼ 7.79, degrees of
freedom [df] ¼ 1, N ¼ 26, P , 0.05) (Figure 2). Thus, the
addition of a decoy option to the choice set caused individuals
to violate regularity by increasing their preference for the
dominant target.
Figure 2
Nest-site preference by individual ants depended on which decoy
nest was present. In the presence of DA, more ants chose A, whereas
in the presence of DB, more ants chose B (v
2 ¼ 7.79, N ¼ 26, P ,
0.05).
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Colonies show rationally consistent preferences
Like individuals, colonies showed no strong preference in the
binary choice, with 11 choosing A and 12 choosing B (2-tailed
binomial test: P ¼ 1.0). In contrast to individuals, however, col-
ony preferences were unaffected by asymmetrically dominated
decoys (v2 ¼ 0.734, df ¼ 1, N ¼ 52, P ¼ 0.392) (Figure 3). Pref-
erences were not identical between the 2 treatments, but the
difference was nonsignificant and opposite to the direction pre-
dicted by the decoy effect and observed in the individual exper-
iment. This result cannot be attributed to low sample size as
power analysis showed that this sample size is adequate to detect
an effect as strong or stronger than that seen in the individual
experiment (power ¼ 0.98 for a ¼ 0.05).
To exclude the possibility that removal of the decoy roof was
responsible for the difference between individuals and colo-
nies, we repeated the DB treatment but allowed colonies to
spontaneously abandon the undamaged decoy (colonies were
unwilling to abandon undamaged DA nests). If the decoy in-
fluences preferences in the same way seen for individuals, we
expected to see a preference for B over A in these tests. In-
stead, we again saw only a nonsignificant trend in the opposite
direction (9 chose A and 6 chose B; 2-tailed binomial test,
P ¼ 0.607).
DISCUSSION
The consistency of colony preferences in these experiments
confirms an earlier result from T. curvispinosus (Edwards
and Pratt 2009). That study examined only colony-level behav-
ior, but the new results show clearly that lone ants are strongly
influenced by decoys that have no effect on colonies. Similar
sensitivity has been shown for individuals of many other spe-
cies, but the decoy effect observed here was especially strong.
For example, some earlier studies found no violation of reg-
ularity but only of the weaker constant ratio rule, which holds
that the relative popularity of 2 options should not be
changed by adding a third option (Bateson et al. 2002). Other
studies found regularity violations but in response to only 1 of
the 2 decoys offered (Bateson et al. 2003). The stronger effect
in our study may be due to our careful selection of equally
preferred targets posing a challenging trade-off between at-
tributes. More importantly, it shows that the rational consis-
tency of colony behavior was not simply a function of our
choice set—instead, colonies showed clearly rational behavior
in a context that induced strong departures from rationality
in lone ants.
This contrast between group and individual reverses a tradi-
tional view that collectives are prone to amplification of individ-
ual irrationality. Our results instead suggest that an appropriately
structured collective can prevent irrationality by avoiding the
overburdening of individual cognitive abilities. A plausible sce-
nario is that lone ants cannot adequately process information
for all 3 nests when inconsistencies among their attributes
complicate assessment. Instead, ants may rely on simplifying
heuristics based on pairwise comparisons, which are also im-
plicated in the decoy effects seen in humans and other ani-
mals (Hastie and Dawes 2001; Bateson and Healy 2005). In
a collective setting, such comparisons are unnecessary because
each ant need assess only one site or at most compare it to her
current home. This limited perspective imposes the best strat-
egy for consistent choice: evaluate a given option the same
way regardless of the available alternatives. The separate eval-
uations of many ants are then integrated through a communi-
cation network and complex behavioral algorithm (Pratt et al.
2005; Pratt and Sumpter 2006). The result is emergence of
a rational group decision from ants prone to individual irra-
tionality.
Under this scenario, the group paradoxically benefits by
limiting the information available to each of its members. In
laboratory emigrations by Temnothorax colonies, such limited
information is the rule: Most ants do not visit more than one
of the available candidate sites or do so only after decision
making is well underway (Mallon et al. 2001; Robinson et al.
2009). This is not necessarily an adaptive response by the
colony but a constraint imposed by the great difference in
scale between ants and the area they must search. It is unlikely
for each ant to find more than one site in time to influence
the colony. Some ants, however, do get to visit more than one
site. What impact might they have on the colony’s choice?
Robinson et al. (2009) suggest that even these knowledgeable
ants refrain from making comparisons partly to avoid the re-
sulting risks of irrational inconsistency. Our results, however,
contradict this idea. If informed individuals do not compare
options, then we should not have seen any influence of the
decoy on the preferences of isolated ants. Instead, decoys
strongly changed individual preferences between A and B.
In a colony setting, however, this effect may have relatively
little influence on the collective decision. Even if some ants
show irrational behavior, their influence is likely swamped by
the much larger number of ants that do not have the oppor-
tunity to compare sites.
Although a long line of research has noted the error-reducing
potential of collective choice, the focus has been on random
errors that can be cancelled out by a straightforward process of
summation (Grunbaum 1998; Conradt and Roper 2003;
Franks, Dornhaus, et al. 2003; Simons 2004; Surowiecki 2004;
Ward et al. 2008). For example, a group of migrants may aver-
age their noisy estimates of the proper travel direction to
achieve a more precise heading. In contrast, the decoy effect
and other cases of irrational choice involve systematic prefer-
ence changes that cannot be cancelled out by summing the
choices of many independent decision makers (Livnat and
Pippenger 2008). Collective choice can only limit these errors
if it allows individuals to show qualitatively different behavior
in the social context than they do when alone. For the ants,
the key difference is that lone ants must make comparisons,
but ants in the social context need not. Comparison of options
is instead an emergent property of the colony as a whole.
This reasoning suggests that differences in the structure of
individual and group cognition explain the contrast we ob-
served.However, wemust also consider whether the explanation
lies in other differences between the 2 cases. An obvious meth-
odological difference is that lone ants spontaneously aban-
doned the intact decoy nest to choose one of the targets,
whereas colonies left the decoy only after its roof was removed.
Destruction of their nest might spare colonies from the decoy
effect if ants rapidly forget the attributes of their ruined home.
This possibility is discounted by the behavior of colonies that
Figure 3
Nest-site preference by colonies was not affected by decoy type (v2 ¼
0.734, N ¼ 52, P ¼ 0.392).
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were allowed to abandon an intact nest just like the lone ants.
Colonies did this only when living in decoy DB, but their pref-
erences were indistinguishable from those of colonies forced
from DB by removal of its roof: That is, they showed no prefer-
ence for the dominant target just as expected under rational
choice. This is consistent with earlier work that found an effect
of home nest quality on emigration behavior even after the
home was destroyed (Healey and Pratt 2008).
Another possible confounding factor is the unnatural isola-
tion of ants in the individual experiments. This may have
caused very different motivational states or preference func-
tions than the same ants would show in a colony context.
For example, isolated ants might hastily seek any haven for
their brood rather than deliberating over the best nest. This
possibility is countered by the slow decision speeds of these
ants; rather than rush into any shelter, they spent at least as
long as whole colonies before moving the brood to their final
choice. The first check of experimental arenas was typically
made 3 to 5 h after introducing the target nests; although
most colonies had made a decision by this point, few individ-
uals had. More importantly, lone ants and colonies showed
very similar preferences in the binary choice when only the
target sites A and B were present, suggesting that the lack of
social context did not strongly alter preferences. Even if iso-
lation did influence choice behavior, this would not change
the essential irrationality of the lone ants’ behavior compared
with that of colonies. Whatever a decision-maker’s preferen-
ces, they should remain consistent in the presence of an un-
attractive decoy. Lone ants strongly violated this expectation,
whereas colonies did not.
These findings emphasize the importance of context in eval-
uating decision-making behavior. Like other ants, Temnothorax
are obligately social, typically making nest-site choices collec-
tively rather than relying on fully informed individuals. In this
sense, the ants are ecologically rational (Stephens et al.
2004)—their behavior maximizes fitness in natural settings,
if not in the experimental context of isolated ants. The find-
ing that rationality is attained by the group, despite the po-
tential for irrationality by individual members, suggests a
novel advantage to group living and one that may also prove
relevant to other social animals.
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images, demonstrating that the 
effect is not driven by incidental 
stimulus-related characteristics. 
Further, threatening — but not 
non-threatening — stimuli were 
judged as arriving earlier than 
scrambled versions of the same 
images, suggesting that the effect is 
driven specifically by responses to 
threatening stimuli.
Experiment 3 investigated whether 
reduced time-to-collision judgments 
could reflect a non-specific effect of 
seeing threatening stimuli, such as 
heightened arousal. Participants saw 
threatening or non-threatening stimuli 
for one second, immediately followed 
by a looming blue disc. If the effect 
we report is a non-specific effect of 
seeing threatening stimuli, time-to-
collision judgments of the blue disc 
should be faster when preceded 
by images of threatening stimuli. 
Contrary to this prediction, priming 
images had no apparent effect on 
time-to-collision judgments of a 
semantically-neutral disc. 
Threatening stimuli are perceived 
as approaching more rapidly than 
non-threatening stimuli, especially 
for those who are fearful of those 
objects. These results show, in 
contrast to the traditional view of 
looming as a purely optical cue to 
object approach [1], that perceiving 
the time of imminent collision is 
not entirely driven by purely optical 
cues, but is also subject to emotional 
modulation. Gibson and colleagues 
[1] pointed out that as an optical cue 
to imminent collision, visual looming is 
a direct perceptual indicator of threat. 
Our results suggest that the affective 
content of looming stimuli also 
affects perceived time-to-collision. 
Underestimating arrival time of 
threatening stimuli may thus serve an 
adaptive role in leading responses to 
err on the side of additional time for 
either fight or flight. Some perceptual 
biases appear only for explicit 
perceptual judgments, but not for 
visually-guided actions [5]. Thus, it 
is possible that the present effect 
reflects a purely perceptual distortion 
that might not affect actions, such as 
catching.
Recent findings have demonstrated 
that emotion modulates some basic 
aspects of perception, such as visual 
contrast sensitivity [6], but not others, 
such as auditory directional attention 
[7]. The selectivity of emotional 
effects on perception is consistent 
with anecdotal reports that specific 
phobias may induce category-
specific distortions of perception [8]. 
Though we investigated variability 
in fear in an unselected sample (i.e. 
generally non-phobic), our results 
provide experimental evidence 
consistent with this proposal. Other 
recent results have also suggested 
that individual differences in fear, 
even in the non-clinical range, alter 
space perception. For example, 
fear of heights is associated with 
distorted perception of vertical 
distance [9], whereas claustrophobic 
fear is associated with increased 
size of the near space immediately 
surrounding the body [10]. The 
present results fit with and extend 
these by showing that emotion not 
only alters the perception of space 
as a static entity, but it also affects 
the perception of dynamically moving 
objects, such as those on a collision 
course with the observer.  
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes experi-
mental procedures and two figures and can 
be found with this article online at  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2012.07.053.
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Groups have a 
larger cognitive 
capacity than 
individuals
Takao Sasaki and Stephen C. Pratt
Increasing the number of options 
can paradoxically lead to worse 
decisions, a phenomenon known as 
cognitive overload [1]. This happens 
when an individual decision-maker 
attempts to digest information 
exceeding its processing capacity. 
Highly integrated groups, such 
as social insect colonies, make 
consensus decisions that combine 
the efforts of many members, 
suggesting that these groups can 
overcome individual limitations [2–4]. 
Here we report that an ant colony 
choosing a new nest site is less 
vulnerable to cognitive overload 
than an isolated ant making this 
decision on her own. We traced 
this improvement to differences 
in individual behavior. In whole 
colonies, each ant assesses only a 
small subset of available sites, and 
the colony combines their efforts to 
thoroughly explore all options. An 
isolated ant, on the other hand, must 
personally assess a larger number 
of sites to approach the same level 
of option coverage. By sharing the 
burden of assessment, the colony 
avoids overtaxing the abilities of its 
members.
Nest site selection by Temnothorax 
ants exemplifies collective decision-
making without well-informed leaders 
[5]. When a colony must find a new 
home, it can choose the better of two 
new sites even when no single ant 
assesses both. Instead, comparison 
emerges from a competition between 
recruitment efforts. Upon finding a 
site, an ant recruits nestmates to it 
with a probability that depends on 
the site’s quality, as determined by 
entrance diameter, cavity size, light 
level, and other features [6]. Her 
recruits make their own quality-
dependent recruitment decisions, 
creating positive feedback that 
directs the colony towards the 
better nest. Consensus is further 
enhanced by a quorum rule that 
accelerates recruitment once a 
site’s population has surpassed a 
threshold [5]. 
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Although this process does not 
require individuals to compare 
sites, they have the ability to do 
so; an isolated ant that assesses 
two sites of different quality can 
reliably choose the better one [7]. 
We took advantage of this fact to 
compare the cognitive capacity of 
groups and individuals. We induced 
subjects (either whole colonies 
or isolated ants of T. rugatulus) to 
select a new nest in one of two 
conditions. In the simpler condition 
they chose between only two nests, 
one good and one poor. In the more 
challenging condition, they chose 
among eight options, four good and 
four poor (Figure 1A). Good nests 
differed only in having a smaller 
entrance, a strongly favored feature 
[6]. Decision performance was 
measured by noting which type of 
nest the subject moved into. 
We found that individuals 
performed significantly worse when 
the number of options was eight 
rather than two, indicating that they 
experienced cognitive overload 
(2 = 4.18, N = 43, df = 1, p < 0.05). 
In the two-nest condition, over 80% 
of ants chose a good nest, but in 
the eight-nest condition, only 50% 
did, indistinguishable from random 
performance. Colonies, on the other 
hand, performed equally well with 
either two or eight options, with at 
least 90% choosing a good nest in 
each condition (2 = 0.36, N = 40, 
df = 1, p = 0.55) (Figure 1B). Thus, 
colonies achieved a significantly 
higher decision performance in the 
face of increased processing load 
than did individuals (partial 2 test:  
2 = 8.75, N = 3, df = 3, p = 0.03). 
We hypothesized that colonies 
better handle higher option numbers 
because their members do not have 
to assess as many sites as isolated 
individuals. If so, we predicted that 
each colony member visits a smaller 
number of nests than an isolated 
ant. To test this, we repeated the 
eight-nest treatment, but counted 
the number of sites visited by each 
ant. The results of this second 
experiment confirmed our prediction: 
isolated ants assessed significantly 
more sites than did colony members 
(Wilcoxon rank test: W = 1819, 
Nisolated = 10, Ncolony = 209, 
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Figure 1. Effect of option number on decision performance. 
(A) Experimental arenas. Subjects (whole colonies or isolated ants) were made to abandon 
their home nest (H) and choose a new nest from an array of either two or eight good (G) and 
poor (P) options. (B) Numbers of subjects choosing good or poor nests in each treatment. 
Isolated ants made worse decisions with eight options than with two (top chart), but colonies 
nearly always chose a good nest regardless of the number of options (bottom chart). (C) In 
the eight-nest condition, isolated ants visited more nests than did individual colony members. 
Boxes delimit the 1st and 3rd quartiles, the horizontal line indicates the median, and whiskers 
show the range. Open circles are outliers.
p < 0.01) (Figure 1C). Importantly, 
although each colony member visited 
very few sites, the colony collectively 
assessed all eight sites.
The inferior performance of 
isolated ants cannot be explained 
as a simple artifact of isolating 
these normally very social animals. 
Lone ants performed just as well as 
colonies when choosing between 
two sites; only with an increase in 
option number did their ability to 
select a good nest decline (Figure 
1B). Nor can the colony advantage 
be ascribed to a higher probability 
of finding a good site. Because half 
of the options were good in both 
conditions, the probability of finding 
a good nest did not depend on the 
number of options available for 
either colonies or individuals (see 
the Supplemental Information for 
details). Furthermore, when isolated 
ants were tracked in the second 
experiment, all of them found at 
least one good nest. Indeed, they 
found many more sites than did all 
but a few individual colony members 
(Figure 1C). The small minority 
of colony members that visited a 
large number of nests contributed 
little to total transport effort, and 
thus to the colony’s decision (see 
the Supplemental Information for 
details). Therefore, we attribute 
the worse performance of isolated 
ants to the difficulty of processing 
a greater load of data. We cannot 
say why isolated ants do not avoid 
this problem by simply assessing 
fewer sites. However, we speculate 
that they prolong their search 
for new nests because they lack 
social interactions, such as quorum 
attainment, that would normally 
trigger earlier acceptance of a site.
Cognitive overload is a growing 
issue for human decision-making, 
as unprecedented access to data 
poses new challenges to individual 
processing abilities [1]. Human 
groups also solve difficult problems 
better when each group member has 
only limited access to information [8]. 
For social insects, this advantage is 
likely much greater, because natural 
selection on colony-level phenotypes 
has shaped particularly elaborate 
and highly integrated group 
cognition. This is because selection 
acts largely through the reproductive 
success of whole colonies, rather 
than that of the sterile workers that 
make them up [9].
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It has long been recognized 
that collective choice can improve 
accuracy by averaging out 
the random errors of inaccurate 
individual decisions [3]. The 
advantage we find here is different: 
rather than combining many 
essentially identical choices, 
colonies truly distribute their 
decision-making. No worker 
must carry out the full task of 
assessing and comparing all options, 
allowing the colony as a whole to 
process more information, more 
effectively. This advantage can 
serve as a model for the rapidly 
developing field of collective 
robotics, which looks to the robust, 
decentralized group behavior of 
social animals for biologically 
inspired design ideas [10].
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes 
experimental procedures, results and 
two figures and can be found with this 
article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.cub.2012.07.058.
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aluminum sulfate (Alum) — were 
evaluated by volunteers for perceived 
astringency intensity over the 
course of 80 oral exposures (sips). 
The astringency intensity curves 
grew exponentially over exposures, 
regardless of the compound or 
concentration (Figure 1A and Figure 
S1 in the Supplemental Information). 
Each astringent solution, however, 
elicited distinct maxima (a + y0) 
depending on the concentration level. 
Weakly concentrated solutions never 
reached the astringency maxima of 
more concentrated solutions of the 
same compound. In addition, the rate 
(b) at which maximal intensity was 
reached over trials varied with both the 
chemical structure and concentration 
(Figure 1B). Here, Alum and EGCG 
solutions reach their astringency 
maxima faster at high concentrations 
than low, whereas GSE solutions 
reach their maximum at the same rate 
regardless of the concentration.
After establishing that weak 
astringents could elicit strong 
astringency with repeated sampling, 
we asked subjects to rate fattiness 
and astringency, after ingesting pieces 
of fatty food (dried meat) alternating 
with multiple sips of one of two rinsing 
solutions (tea or water). Astringent 
rinses affected oral sensations. In 
particular, the perceived fattiness 
was less pronounced after drinking 
tea than after drinking water (Figure 
1C left panel). Thus, astringent 
consumption during meals provided 
a greater reduction of oral fattiness 
compared to water rinses. We also 
observed a more significant growth 
of astringency sensation with 
multiple sips without eating a fatty 
food, indicating that fat reduced the 
build-up of astringency (Figure 1C 
right panel). Similarly, there was a 
greater increase of fatty sensation 
from repeated fatty food consumption 
without any rinsing (Figure 1D left 
panel). These observations support 
the hypothesis that these sensations 
oppose each other perceptually 
and lie at different ends of an oral 
rheological/tribological sensory 
spectrum.
The oral perceptions of fattiness 
and astringency largely depend 
on tactile sensations [7]. Frictional 
rubbing of the oral epithelia is very 
important for food tactile perception. 
For example, foods are commonly 
assessed mechanically ex vivo using 
a tribometer, which measures the 
Opponency of 
astringent and fat 
sensations 
Catherine Peyrot des Gachons1,  
Emi Mura1,2, Camille Speziale1,3, 
Charlotte J. Favreau1,3,  
Guillaume F. Dubreuil1,4,  
and Paul A.S. Breslin1,5
In most cultures, people ingest 
a variety of astringent foods and 
beverages during meals, but the 
reasons for this practice are unclear. 
Many popular beliefs and heuristics, 
such as high tannin wines should 
be balanced with fatty foods, for 
example ‘red wine with red meat’, 
suggest that astringents such as 
pickles, sorbets, wines, and teas 
‘cleanse’ the palate while eating. 
Oral astringents elicit ‘dry, rough’ 
sensations [1], in part, by breaking 
down mucinous lubricating proteins 
in saliva [2,3]. The introduction 
of oral lubricants, including fats, 
partially diminishes strong astringent 
sensations [4,5]. Thus, it appears 
that astringency and fattiness can 
oppose each other perceptually on 
an oral rheological spectrum. Most 
teas, wines, and ‘palate cleansers’, 
however, are only mildly astringent 
and an explanation of how they could 
oppose the fattiness of meals is 
lacking. Here, we demonstrate that 
weakly astringent stimuli can elicit 
strong sensations after repeated 
sampling. Astringency builds with 
exposures [6] to an asymptotic level 
determined by the structure and 
concentration of the compound. We 
also establish that multiple sips of 
a mild astringent solution, similar 
to a wine or tea, decrease oral fat 
sensations elicited by fatty food 
consumption when astringent and 
fatty stimuli alternate, mimicking 
the patterning that occurs during a 
real meal. Consequently, we reveal a 
principle underlying the international 
practice of ‘palate cleansing’. 
Repeatedly alternating samples 
of astringent beverages with fatty 
foods yielded ratings of fattiness 
and astringency that were lower than 
if rinsing with water or if presented 
alone without alternation. 
Three astringents — grape seed 
extract (GSE), epigallocatechin-
gallate (EGCG) from green tea, and 
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Figure S1. Nest design. 
Nests were constructed from a balsa wood slat with a circular hole drilled through 
its center. The roof and floor of the nest were made of glass microscope slides. 
An entrance hole was drilled through the center of the roof.
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Figure S2. Number of brood items transported as a function of the number of 
nests visited. Each bar shows the total number of brood transports by all ants 
that visited a given number of nests during a colony emigration. 
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S1. Materials and Methods 
Nest designs  
Each nest was made from a balsa wood slat (2.4 mm thick) sandwiched between 
glass microscope slides (50 x 75 mm). A circular cavity (38 mm diameter) was 
cut through the middle of the slat, and a round entrance hole was drilled through 
the center of the glass roof (Figure S1). To test for the existence of cognitive 
overload, I designed two kinds of target nests, good and poor. These nests were 
identical except for their entrance sizes: The good nest had a smaller entrance 
(∅ = 2 mm) than did the poor nest (∅ = 5.5 mm). Small entrances are known to 
be of importance to Temnothorax ants, presumably because they are more 
defensible and allow better control of the interior nest environment (Franks et al., 
2003; Visscher, 2007). Subjects started each experimental trial in a standard 
home nest with an intermediate entrance size (∅ = 3.2 mm).  
Subjects 
45 colonies of Temnothorax rugatulus were used for the colony-level tests. An 
additional 13 colonies provided 52 worker ants (four ants per colony) for the 
individual tests. Only a minority of workers in Temnothorax colonies participate 
actively in nest-site scouting and transport of nestmates and brood items, while 
the rest of the colony waits at the home nest (Mallon et al., 2001; Pratt, 2005). In 
order to ensure that I tested only these active ants, I placed brood items outside 
of the colony’s nest and selected workers that attempted to retrieve them. I 
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reasoned that ants willing to leave the nest and retrieve brood were likely to carry 
out similar tasks during colony emigrations (Sasaki & Pratt, 2011). 
Colonies were collected in the Pinal Mountains near Globe, Arizona (N 33° 
19.00’, N 110° 52.56’, W). All had at least one queen, with worker populations 
ranging from 100 to 250 and brood populations ranging from 80 to 300. I 
estimate that 25 to 100 ants (one third of each colony’s worker population) 
actively participated in scouting, site assessment, and recruitment. Each colony 
was housed in a nest like those described above, but with a small entrance (∅ = 
2 mm). Each nest was kept in a plastic box (11 cm x 11 cm), the walls of which 
were coated with Fluon to prevent the ants from escaping. Each box was 
provided with a water-filled plastic tube capped with cotton and an agar-based 
diet that was refreshed weekly (Bhatkar & Whitcomb, 1970). 
Experiment 1: Do colonies have larger cognitive capacities than individuals?  
I compared the decision performance of individuals and colonies when offered 
either two or eight nest sites.  For individuals, a home nest with two brood items 
was placed in the center of a circular arena (34 cm diameter and 3 cm wall). To 
ensure that each individual was aware of the home nest and the brood items, I 
deposited the brood just outside the entrance of the home nest and introduced a 
single individual to the arena. The ant was given 12 hours to find the nest and 
move the brood inside. Then, I placed either 2 target nests (1 good and 1 poor) 
or 8 target nests (4 good and 4 poor) in the arena. In the 8-nest condition, a pair 
of nests (one good and one poor) was placed at each of four equally spaced 
locations around the centrally located home nest (north, south, east, and west). 
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The same nest configuration was used for all trials (Figure 1A). In the 2-nest 
condition, a pair of nests was placed in only one of the four locations, randomly 
chosen for each trial. The distance from the home nest to each of the target 
nests was 10 cm. To induce a move to one of the target nests, the roof of the 
home nest was removed. The ant’s choice was assayed after 12 hours by 
recording the nest to which she had carried the brood items. A total of fifty-two 
individuals were tested. Six never moved the brood items to the home nest, so I 
did not test them further. Three of the remaining individuals did not move to a 
target nest (1 in the two-nest condition and 2 in the eight-nest condition), and so 
were excluded from the analysis.  
For colonies, the procedure was identical to that for individuals except that all 
members of the colony were used. The colony in its old nest was placed next to a 
standard home nest in the center of the arena. The roof of the old nest was then 
removed to induce the colony to move into the home nest. In all cases, colonies 
finished migrating within 12 hours. Then, target nests were introduced, and the 
roof of the home nest was removed to induce the colony to migrate. The colony’s 
choice was assayed by recording the nest to which a strong majority of colony 
members (> 90%) migrated. Among 45 colonies tested, 5 did not choose a target 
nest (2 in the two-nest condition and 3 in the eight-nest condition), and so were 
excluded from the analysis.   
Experiment 2: Do isolated ants assess more nests than ants within colonies? 
If colonies are less vulnerable to cognitive overload because they distribute the 
burden of assessing nests, then each colony member should visit a smaller 
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number of nests than do isolated ants. I carried out a second experiment to test 
this hypothesis. The experiment was identical to the eight-nest condition: both 
colonies and isolated ants were again presented with eight target nests and 
monitored until they moved to one of the nests. However, I counted the number 
of nests visited by each isolated ant and by each ant within a colony. To allow 
individual tracking, ants in each colony were painted with distinctive color 
patterns. Experiments were recorded with a high-resolution camera (Canon t2i) 
that photographed the entire arena at 5-second intervals. I then examined the 
photographs to determine the identity of all visitors to every nest. To accelerate 
this procedure, I used the “batch process” feature of Photoshop to crop and 
zoom in on each nest in each photograph. Because data were collected at 5-
second intervals, I may have missed some very brief visits and thus 
underestimated the number of nests visited. However, ants usually stay longer 
than 5 seconds in a nest, especially during their first visit (Mugford et al., 2001). 
Even if some visits were missed, this should have occurred equally in the two-
nest and eight-nest conditions, and so should not bias comparisons between 
them. I tested 2 colonies and 10 individual ants taken from an additional 5 
colonies (two ants per colony). In the colony tests, a total of 198 individual ants 
were analyzed. 
Preparation 
The wall of the experimental arena was coated with Fluon to prevent ants 
escaping. Before each experiment, all glass slides were washed in a commercial 
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dishwasher, and the experimental arena was cleaned with ethanol. Balsa slats 
were made fresh for each experiment and never re-used.  
Analysis 
I separately tested individuals and colonies for cognitive overload using a χ2 test 
of independence. Our null hypothesis was that the number of subjects choosing 
the good vs. poor nest was independent of condition (two nests vs. eight nests). 
The alternative hypothesis was that a higher proportion of subjects would choose 
the poor nest in the eight-nest condition compared to the two-nest condition. To 
compare the performance of colonies and individuals, I used the three-way (2 x 2 
x 2) χ2 test of partial independence. This tested the null hypothesis that colonies 
and individuals showed the same relation between decision performance 
(proportion choosing a good nest) and condition (two options vs. eight options). 
The statistical package R (v. 2.9.0) was used for all analyses. 
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S2. Results: contribution to colony migration 
The results of Experiment 2 showed that most colony members visited only a few 
nests, but a small minority visited many nests (Figure 1C). If this minority 
significantly contributed to colony decisions, this would contradict the conclusion 
that colonies avoid cognitive overload by minimizing individual cognitive burdens. 
To test this, I further analyzed the Experiment 2 data by estimating each ant’s 
contribution to the colony’s decision. I did this by counting the number of brood 
items transported by each ant. I did not include transports of adults, because the 
position in which an adult is carried obscures the paint marks on the transporter’s 
back. Earlier observations indicate that individual transporters do not discriminate 
between adults and brood items, so the latter should give an unbiased estimate 
of the distribution of transport activity across ants. The results show that the vast 
majority of transport effort was made by ants that visited only one or two nests 
(Figure S2). The minority that visited many nests, and thus potentially 
experienced cognitive overload, contributed little to total transport effort, and thus 
to the colony’s decision. This result is consistent with the conclusion that colonies 
avoid cognitive overload by distributing the burden of assessment across many 
ants. 
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S3. Results: distribution of assessed nests 
Although half of available nests were good in both the two- and the eight-nest 
conditions (Figure 1A), subjects may have had a bias for visiting a certain kind of 
nest. For example, because a poor nest has a larger entrance size than a good 
nest, it might be easier to discover. Any such bias could modify decision 
performance because the distribution of visited nests would deviate from that of 
available nests. To test for a discovery bias, I calculated the proportion of good 
nests among all discovered nests (i.e. number of visited good nests/number of 
visited nests). For isolated individuals in the eight-nest condition, this proportion 
varied (0.33-0.66) but was 0.516 on average. Every colony, on the other hand, 
found all eight available nests, meaning that the proportion was always 0.5. The 
same was true for the two-nest condition, where every subject (both colonies and 
individuals) always found both options. These results show that isolated 
individuals and colonies did not have a bias for discovering either nest type. Thus 
I conclude that the low performance for isolated individuals in the eight-nest 
condition can best be explained by cognitive overload.  
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